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DANGER AHEAD: RISK ASSESSMENT AND THE
FUTURE OF BAIL REFORM
John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson*
Abstract: In the last five years, legislators in all fifty states have made changes to their
pretrial justice systems. Reform efforts aim to shrink jails by incarcerating fewer people—
particularly poor, low-risk defendants and racial minorities. Many jurisdictions are
embracing pretrial risk assessment instruments—statistical tools that use historical data to
forecast which defendants can safely be released—as a centerpiece of reform. Now, many are
questioning the extent to which pretrial risk assessment instruments actually serve reform
goals. Existing scholarship and debate centers on how the instruments themselves may
reinforce racial disparities and on how their opaque algorithms may frustrate due process
interests.
This Article highlights three underlying challenges that have yet to receive the attention
they require. First, today’s risk assessment tools lead to what we term “zombie predictions.”
That is, predictive models trained on data from older bail regimes are blind to the riskreducing benefits of recent bail reforms. This may cause predictions that systematically
overestimate risk. Second, “decision-making frameworks” that mediate the court system’s
use of risk estimates embody crucial moral judgments, yet currently escape appropriate
public scrutiny. Third, in the long-term, these tools risk giving an imprimatur of scientific
objectivity to ill-defined concepts of “dangerousness,” may entrench the Supreme Court’s
historically recent blessing of preventive detention for dangerousness, and could pave the
way for an increase in preventive detention.
Pretrial risk assessment instruments, as they are currently built and used, cannot safely be
assumed to support reformist goals of reducing incarceration and addressing racial and
poverty-based inequities. This Article contends that system stakeholders who share those
goals are best off focusing their reformist energies on other steps that can more directly
promote decarceral changes and greater equity in pretrial justice. Where pretrial risk
assessments remain in use, this Article proposes two vital steps that should be seen as
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minimally necessary to address the challenges surfaced. First, where they choose to embrace
risk assessment, jurisdictions must carefully define what they wish to predict, gather and use
local, recent data, and continuously update and calibrate any model on which they choose to
rely, investing in a robust data infrastructure where necessary to meet these goals. Second,
instruments and frameworks must be subject to strong, inclusive governance.
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INTRODUCTION
A.

The Story of Springfield

Springfield County1 has an open secret: It keeps many low-income
people in jail who could safely be released. Most of these people are
people of color. Two years ago, policymakers in Springfield joined a
national trend, and approved a suite of reforms that they hoped would
dramatically reduce the jail population. Their goal was to shrink the jail
by detaining only those few defendants who were too risky to safely
release pending trial, while sparing most of the large, low-income
accused population from the life-altering consequences of even a short
jail stay.
As a central focus of its reforms, Springfield adopted a popular
“pretrial risk assessment tool”—a statistical tool that uses historical data
to forecast and advise judges which defendants can be safely released at
arraignment.2 County leaders and local advocates believed that the tool
itself, by providing objective information about the low risk posed by
most defendants, would lead judges to release more defendants, reduce
existing racial disparities in the pretrial jail population, and reduce
rearrests and missed court dates among those released.
Buoyed partly by their optimism about the new digital tool,
policymakers also approved several other changes that strengthened
alternatives to pretrial incarceration, including drug counseling, text
message reminders of upcoming court dates, and ankle-worn GPS
monitors that could be mandated in lieu of incarceration. Two years after
reform was introduced, the situation remains disappointing.
Springfield’s average pretrial jail population has declined slightly, but
the sweeping change supporters first imagined has not arrived.
Moreover, the number of defendants remanded to custody with no offer
of bail actually increased. And the number of individuals with nonfinancial conditions of release, especially GPS monitoring, has
1. An imaginary—but otherwise typical—U.S. jurisdiction.
2. How pretrial risk assessment tools are developed and work in practice is detailed in
section III.A.
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skyrocketed. Rearrest rates remain the same, while failure to appear rates
have risen slightly. And judges reject the risk assessment tool’s
recommendations in nearly half of cases—nearly always in a more
punitive direction relative to what the tool recommended.3
In the wake of what was supposed to be landmark reform, local
leaders are left asking: What happened? Several answers are apparent.
First, Springfield’s pretrial risk assessment tool has a numbers problem.
The tool’s predictions are based on historic patterns in the combined
data of many other jurisdictions—places that often had higher crime
rates than Springfield and that offered little-to-nothing in the way of
pretrial services during the periods when the data was generated. The
tool’s predictions are neither tailored to Springfield nor updated to
reflect the impact of Springfield’s latest reforms. Taken together, these
discrepancies have the perverse effect of not only making the accused in
Springfield appear more likely to be rearrested or fail to appear to court
than they truly are, but also of continuing patterns of unneeded jailing
and encouraging overuse of restrictive conditions, like new GPS
monitors.
Second, there is a moral question at the heart of every risk
assessment tool—namely, how to balance various risks with the liberty
and due process interests of the accused—and Springfield’s leaders
largely ignored that question. The “decision-making framework,” which
converts raw risk assessment scores into proposed conditions of release,
was treated as an afterthought, and in the end, the framework
recommended far more defendants for burdensome conditions or
detention than the reform’s architects anticipated. As a result, the new
tool’s recommendations, even if strictly adhered to by judges, would not
have done much to help Springfield achieve its stated goal of
decarceration.
Third, the pretrial risk assessment tool was opaque, with vital
information unavailable. Defendants, lawyers, and judges are not able to
understand what factors led an individual to be forecast as a high risk of
rearrest, nor could they learn precisely what data had been used, and in
what way, to create the tool. Even if they had wanted to, Springfield
officials would not have been able to update the system’s underlying
model with new pretrial release data.

3. Throughout the Article, we use the term “judges” for the actors responsible for making pretrial
decisions. Across the country, this title varies. We use “judge” for simplicity’s sake.
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Bail, Reform, and Risk Assessment

The parable of Springfield is fictional but holds important lessons.
For nearly a century, scholars have charted how the American system of
money bail needlessly jails low-income defendants, often derailing their
lives, simply because they cannot afford to pay for release.4 Today,
recognizing this problem, legislators and courts in many jurisdictions are
exploring a wide range of reforms that replace or cabin money bail,
aiming to provide reasonable assurance of the defendant’s reappearance
at trial and the protection of public safety without financial conditions.
Reform steps are varied, and include drug diversion programs, GPS
monitoring of people who are released, and pretrial services, such as
reminding defendants of upcoming court dates.5
One popular reform, addressed in at least twenty laws in fourteen
states since 2012, is the introduction of statistical risk assessment tools.6
Such tools use historical data to describe how often defendants similar to
the current one failed to appear for a court date, or were rearrested
pending resolution of their cases. Until recently, risk assessments were
widely portrayed as progressive tools that will help shrink jails by
releasing indigent, low-risk defendants who could not afford to pay
money bail. Last year, the National Association of Counties even called
on local officials to adopt risk assessment tools, and a cohort of
prominent public defense and criminal defense groups called for “the use
of validated pretrial risk assessment in all jurisdictions, as a necessary

4. See generally ARTHUR BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO 160 (1927) (documenting the
inequities of the bail system, and also finding that “[t]he present system . . . neither guarantees
security to society nor safeguards the rights of the accused”).
5. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TRENDS IN PRETRIAL RELEASE: STATE
LEGISLATION 1–2 (2018) [hereinafter TRENDS IN PRETRIAL RELEASE 2018],
http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/ImageLibrary/WebImages/Criminal%20Justice/pretrialEnactments_2
017_v03.pdf [https://perma.cc/CUQ5-V7ZP].
6. AMBER WIDGERY, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES. TRENDS IN PRETRIAL
RELEASE: STATE LEGISLATION 1 (2015) [hereinafter TRENDS IN PRETRIAL RELEASE 2015],
http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/ImageLibrary/WebImages/Criminal%20Justice/NCSL%20pretrialTre
nds_v05.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2YD-QW5W] (noting that “[f]rom 2012 to 2014, 261 new laws in
47 states addressed pretrial policy,” to show that the pace of legislation related to pretrial policy is
also rapid). From 2012 to 2017, every state enacted a new pretrial policy—there were 500 new
enactments, with 122 new enactments alone in forty-two states in 2015. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, TRENDS IN PRETRIAL RELEASE: STATE LEGISLATION UPDATE 1–2 (2017)
[hereinafter TRENDS IN PRETRIAL RELEASE 2017], https://comm.ncsl.org/productfiles/98120201
/NCSL-Pretrial-Trends-Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/HAN8-QX6N].
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component of a fair pretrial release system.”7 This Article offers a
different view.
Part I describes how America’s approach to money bail arose, the
injustices that American bail practices have always entailed, and the
challenges and reversals earlier reform efforts faced. Part II describes
today’s reform efforts, which are motivated by the enormous human and
social costs that current bail regimes impose on the accused, their
families, and their communities.
Part III explains the current practice of pretrial risk assessment and
describes three underlying challenges that have yet to receive the
attention they require. First, today’s risk assessment tools will likely lead
to what we term “zombie predictions,” where old data, reflecting
outdated bail practices, is newly reanimated through statistical prediction
that is blind to the benefits of local or recent reforms. Jurisdictions often
do not measure the changing landscape of actual risks their defendants
face, let alone update their forecasts of risk to reflect that changing
landscape. This Article argues that these issues lead many instruments to
systematically overestimate risk, and it reviews early empirical evidence
that suggests overestimation may already be occurring. Second, the
“decision-making frameworks” that mediate the court system’s
understanding and use of risk estimates embody crucial moral judgments
and shape the impact of risk assessment tools on incarceration levels, yet
currently escape broad public input and scrutiny. Harsh frameworks may
undercut the apparent impact of other pretrial reforms, particularly when
combined with exaggerated estimates of risk. Third, the embrace of
pretrial risk assessment instruments exposes longer-term doctrinal and
policy risks for advocates of bail reform. Specifically, these new tools
risk giving an imprimatur of scientific objectivity to ill-defined concepts
of “dangerousness,” and may entrench the Supreme Court’s recent
blessing of preventive detention for dangerousness—which, in turn,
could pave the way for a possible increase in preventive detention.
Part IV proposes two vital steps that are minimally necessary to
address these core challenges. First, where they choose to embrace risk
assessment, jurisdictions must rely on local, recent data; continuously
update and calibrate any model on which they choose to rely; and
carefully define what it is they wish to predict. Notably, these steps
require resources: many jurisdictions will need to make new investments
7. GIDEON’S PROMISE ET AL., JOINT STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE USE OF PRETRIAL RISK
ASSESSMENT
INSTRUMENTS
4
(2017)
(emphasis
added),
https://www.publicdefenders.us/files/Defenders%20Statement%20on%20Pretrial%20RAI%20May
%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FE5-NA7R].

08 - Koepke & Robinson (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

12/28/2018 4:27 PM

RISK ASSESSMENT AND THE FUTURE OF BAIL REFORM

1731

to create a robust data infrastructure in order to become capable of
wielding prediction responsibly. Second, where such instruments are
used at all, the instruments and frameworks must be subject to strong,
inclusive governance. Such governance should mean at least that the
tools themselves never recommend detention, that the risk assessments
and frameworks are public, and that the communities most impacted by
mass incarceration are directly involved in shaping the tools and
frameworks.
Part V concludes that pretrial risk assessment instruments, as
currently used and implemented, cannot safely be assumed to advance
reformist goals of reducing incarceration and enhancing the bail
system’s fairness. Early evidence remains sparse, and risk assessment
instruments may yet prove themselves effective tools in the arsenal of
bail reform. But, to date, they have not done so. Without careful design
and open governance, this Article finds that it is more likely than not that
these tools will perpetuate or worsen the very problems reform
advocates hope to solve.
The United States has used money bail for more than a century, and
reformers have been working for nearly as long to address its ills.8 Now
that risk assessment tools are becoming a widespread part of the pretrial
landscape, basic justice and equity require a clear-eyed view of these
tools, their limits, and how those limits can be addressed. This Article
aims to contribute to that effort.
I.

AMERICA’S CONTESTED APPROACH TO BAIL

A bail hearing has always involved a prediction, but what is being
predicted has changed. Historically, the goal of a bail hearing was to
ensure a defendant’s appearance for trial, and the question was what it
would take to ensure the defendant’s reappearance in court.9 Bail
hearings have since evolved to incorporate (and in many cases to center
on) predictions of a criminal defendant’s dangerousness—that is, the risk
that he or she will commit future crimes if released.10
The story of this turn toward dangerousness begins, improbably, with
the civil rights movement and what commentators often call the “first

8. See infra Part II (detailing the history of bail and bail reform in the United States).
9. Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OH. ST. L.J. 723, 731–34 (2011).
10. John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2, 15–16 (1985).
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formal generation” of bail reform.11 These reforms focused on
eliminating inappropriate uses of pretrial detention, especially among
poor defendants.12 The story ends after a second wave of bail changes,
during which the Supreme Court ultimately held that the Eighth
Amendment provides individuals with no absolute right to bail.13
The pendulum of policy change swung first toward more liberal
release policies as a part of the civil rights movement, then reversed as
conservatives in the Nixon and Reagan years reengineered pretrial
practice toward a “law and order” approach.14 Ultimately, this history
suggests that risk assessment tools cannot safely be presumed to be
instruments of decarceration, notwithstanding the widespread public
hope that they will play that role.15

11. Timothy Schnacke, The Third Generation of Bail Reform, in NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 8, 9 (Deborah W. Smith, Charles F. Campbell & Blake P.
Kavanagh eds., 2017), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/Trends%202017/Trends2017-Final-small.ashx [https://perma.cc/8T74-P4B5].
12. See TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, MICHAEL R. JONES & CLAIRE M.B. BOOKER, PRETRIAL JUSTICE
INST.,
THE
HISTORY
OF
BAIL
AND
PRETRIAL
RELEASE
10–12
(2010),
https://b.3cdn.net/crjustice/2b990da76de40361b6_rzm6ii4zp.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9XW-NM3P].
13. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
14. ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF
MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 134, 139 (2016) (emphasis added). Our understanding and
framing is indebted to the work of historians and scholars who have critically examined the role of
the Johnson Administration in, paradoxically, helping pave the way for the massive changes under
the Nixon and Reagan administrations. See, e.g., id. at 14 (“By expanding the federal government’s
power in the pursuit of twinned social welfare and social control goals, Johnson paradoxically paved
the way for the anticrime policies of the Nixon and Ford administrations to be turned against his
own antipoverty programs. Nixon merely appropriated the regressive aspects of the Johnson
administration as his own . . . .”); see also Elizabeth Hinton, “A War Within Our Own Boundaries”:
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society and the Rise of the Carceral State, 102 J. AM. HIST. 100, 102
(2015) (“Far from being ambivalent about crime control as a major aim of domestic policy, Johnson
and his radical domestic programs laid the foundation of the carceral state, opening an entirely new
plane of domestic social programs centered on crime control, surveillance, and incarceration.”).
15. This observation, of course, is not new. Writing in 1992, Malcolm M. Feeley and Jonathan
Simon detailed what they termed the “new penology,” which replaced “a moral or clinical
description of the individual with an actuarial language of probabilistic calculations and statistical
distributions applied to populations.” Malcom M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology:
Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 452,
455 (1992). In their view, “[t]he new penology is neither about punishing nor about rehabilitating
individuals. It is about identifying and managing unruly groups. It is concerned with the rationality
not of individual behavior or even community organization, but of managerial processes. Its goal is
not to eliminate crime but to make it tolerable through systemic coordination.” Id. See also Eric
Silver & Lisa L. Miller, A Cautionary Note on the Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment Tools for
Social Control, 48 CRIM. & DELINQ. 138, 157 (2002) (arguing that “[i]nsufficient attention has been
paid to the negative potential embodied in actuarial social control technologies that, in the name of
science and safety, increasingly conceptualize the individual in terms of population
aggregates . . . [and] the activities that must follow once risk is assessed”).
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The Origins of American Bail

Historically, American criminal defendants were generally presumed
to have a right to bail—the right either to be released outright until their
trial, or else to obtain release subject to some judicially imposed (usually
financial) condition.16 The exceptions to this general rule were capital
cases, where the threat of execution was presumed likely to impel a
defendant to flee the jurisdiction if released.17 In early American history,
such release conditions typically took the form of a third-party
“pledge”—someone known to the court who would be financially liable
if the defendant failed to appear when required.18 “Bail historically
served the sole purpose of returning the defendant to court for trial, not
preventing her from committing additional crimes.”19
Between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
commercial bond industry superseded the personal surety system.20
Despite that watershed revolution, a bail hearing’s predictive goal
remained the same: ensuring a defendant’s appearance. For example, in

16. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *296 (explaining that the accused must
“put in securities for his appearance, to answer the charge against him”); TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE,
NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR
PRETRIAL PRACTITIONERS AND A FRAMEWORK FOR AMERICAN PRETRIAL REFORM (2014).
17. This exception was longstanding. As William Blackstone wrote, “[f]or what is it that a man
may not be induced to forfeit to save his own life?” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*297. Notably, a substantial number of crimes in the eighteenth century were capital offenses. See,
e.g., John N. Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. REV.
1223, 1227 (1969) (noting that “at that time the great majority of criminal offenses involving a
threat of serious physical injury or death were punishable by death under state laws”).
18. SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN
AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 164 (2018).
19. Baradaran, supra note 9, 731.
20. First, the personal surety system of the early United States depended upon the sufficient
availability of community members able to serve as sureties. But the pace at which the United States
grew diluted the important community ties that made the personal surety click. Compounding this
problem was a seemingly ever-expanding western frontier, which only appeared to increase an
individual’s likelihood of flight. Peggy M. Tobolowsky & James F. Quinn, Pretrial Release in the
1990s: Texas Takes Another Look at Nonfinancial Release Conditions, 19 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 267, 274 n.38 (1993). Second, changes in court practice contributed to the
demise of the personal surety system and “courts began eroding historic rules against profiting from
bail and indemnifying sureties, slowly ushering in the commercial bail bonding business at the end
of the century.” TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MONEY AS
A CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAKEHOLDER: THE JUDGE’S DECISION TO RELEASE OR DETAIN A
DEFENDANT PRETRIAL 26 (2014) [hereinafter MONEY AS A STAKEHOLDER]. These changes led
states to experiment with new ways of ensuring a defendant’s appearance and administering bail, all
of which “combined to give birth to . . . the commercial money bail bond industry.” SCHNACKE ET
AL., supra note 12, at 6.
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Stack v. Boyle,21 the Supreme Court detailed how the commercial bail
bond industry complemented the longstanding purpose of bail:
The right to release before trial is conditioned upon the
accused’s giving adequate assurance that he will stand
trial . . . . Like the ancient practice of securing the oaths of
responsible persons to stand as sureties for the accused, the
modern practice of requiring a bail bond or the deposit of a sum
of money subject to forfeiture serves as additional assurance of
the presence of an accused.22
A bail hearing’s officially narrow focus on ensuring a defendant
would reappear at trial, however, was never the whole story.
Unofficially, a defendant’s predicted dangerousness has always mattered
to some degree, and it “was widely acknowledged that judges
deliberately set unaffordable bail amounts on pretextual flight risk
grounds so that dangerous individuals would be detained until trial.”23
By setting unattainable bail amounts—a practice known as sub rosa
preventive detention—judges were able to prevent defendants they
believed to be dangerous from getting out of jail.24
Despite a recognition that judges sometimes did look to
considerations other than flight risk in setting bail, the propriety of
looking beyond flight risk was hotly contested. At the National
Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice in 1964, the issue of preventive
detention on account of a defendant’s perceived dangerousness was
described as “[p]erhaps the most perplexing of all problems.”25 Some
argued that the “jailing of persons by courts because of anticipated, but
uncommitted crimes, is a concept wholly at war with the basic traditions
of American justice.”26 Others argued that the “possibility of preventive
detention should be a matter of discretion in cases where the welfare and
safety of the public is in peril.”27 The debate would run for more than a
decade and, in the end, transform bail.

21. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
22. Id. at 4–5 (emphasis added).
23. Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 BYU L. REV. 837,
848 (2016).
24. Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 503 (2018).
25. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & THE VERA FOUND., PROCEEDINGS AND INTERIM REPORT OF
NATIONAL
CONFERENCE
ON
BAIL
AND
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
xxix
(1965),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Photocopy/355NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/XN24-GQ4W].
26. Id. at 170.
27. Id. at 165.
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The Civil Rights Era: Fighting to End Poverty Jailing

The early 1960s bail reform effort was tied to the larger movement for
civil rights. It focused on the plight of poor defendants in crowded
jails.28 The commercial bail bond industry promised to assist defendants
in financial distress. In reality, however, it helped create that distress,
mostly by supporting widespread financial conditions and then charging
steep up-front fees and collateral for their services.29 Civil-rights era
reformers built their advocacy, in part, on empirical work that
established two key findings: that jails were overcrowded with
defendants who could not meet financial conditions of release,30 and that
defendants with community ties could, in fact, be released safely—even
when they could not afford to pay bail.31
These findings were not necessarily new. As early as 1927, a seminal
report on Chicago’s bail system detailed how poor defendants
languished in pretrial detention solely because they could not pay small
bail amounts.32 Similarly, a 1954 study of bail in Philadelphia found that
the “practical effect of Philadelphia[’s] methods for determining the
amount of bail is to deny bail to . . . a substantial proportion of those
charged with lesser crimes [and also] explain the chronic overcrowding
in the untried department of the County Prison.”33 Concern over New
York’s money bail system led the Vera Institute of Justice to design and
implement the 1961 Manhattan Bail Project, which demonstrated that
defendants with strong community ties could be released on their own
recognizance without increasing rates of failure to appear.34 Even if they
28. Goldkamp, supra note 10, at 2; see also Jeffrey Fagan & Martin Guggenheim, Preventive
Detention and the Judicial Prediction of Dangerousness for Juveniles: A Natural Experiment, 86 J.
CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 417 (“The first reforms, in the 1960s, were aimed principally at
eliminating the unregulated use of pretrial detention, primarily among poor defendants in urban
jails. Reformers were critical of the conditions of confinement in American jails, the discriminatory
setting of unaffordable bail for the urban poor and the indirect use of punitive detention.”).
29. MONEY AS A STAKEHOLDER, supra note 20, at 31.
30. Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV.
1031 (1954) [hereinafter Administration of Bail in Philadelphia].
31. See EVIE LOTZE ET AL., PRETRIAL SERVS. RES. CTR., THE PRETRIAL SERVICES REFERENCE
BOOK 9 (1999), https://pretrial.harriscountytx.gov/Library1/The%20Pretrial%20Services%20
Reference%20Book.pdf [https://perma.cc/D346-R7NU]. The Manhattan Bail Project found that,
after three years of operation, 65% of interviewees/arrestees could be safely released pretrial with
only 1% of them failing to appear for trial. Id.
32. ARTHUR BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO (1927).
33. Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, supra note 30, at 1048–49.
34. SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 12, at 10 (“The project generated national interest in bail
reform, and within two years programs modeled after the Manhattan Bail Project were launched in
St. Louis, Chicago, Tulsa, Washington D.C., Des Moines, and Los Angeles.”).
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were not necessarily revelatory, these findings spurred reform efforts
that sought to minimize cash bail and increase the use of release
alternatives.
In 1966 Congress responded by nearly unanimously passing the Bail
Reform Act to “assure that all persons, regardless of their financial
status, shall not needlessly be detained” pretrial.35 The Bail Reform Act
of 1966 sought to promote release on recognizance, and minimize
reliance on money bail. It established that a defendant’s financial status
should not be a reason for denying their pretrial release,36 made clear
that the risk of nonappearance at trial should be the only criterion
considered when bail is assessed,37 and mandated that non-capital
defendants be released with the least restrictive set of conditions that
would ensure their appearance at trial.38 The Act also generally forbade
judges from treating a defendant’s dangerousness or risk to public safety
as a reason for detention.39
There were, however, three key exceptions to that rule: capital cases,
cases where convicted defendants awaited sentencing, and cases where
convicted defendants filed an appeal.40 These exceptions represented the

35. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3146-3151 (2018)).
36. Id. § 2 (“The purpose of this Act is to revise the practices relating to bail to assure that all
persons, regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be detained pending their
appearance . . . .”).
37. In making the determination that an individual would be likely to appear in court, the Act
allowed judges to consider a wide range of factors, including the defendant’s “family ties,
employment, financial resources, character and mental condition, the length of his residence in the
community, his record of convictions, and his record of appearance at court proceedings or of flight
to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court.” 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b).
38. Id. § 3146(a).
39. In United States v. Leathers, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the structure of the
1966 Act and “its legislative history make it clear that in noncapital cases pretrial detention cannot
be premised upon an assessment of danger to the public.” 412 F.2d 169, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1969). That
is because “only limited consideration was given to the protection of society from crimes which
might be perpetrated by persons released under the Act; in fact, Congress specifically postponed
consideration of those issues relating to crimes committed by persons released pending trial.”
Warren L. Miller, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: Need for Reform in 1969, 19 CATH. U. L. REV. 24,
32 (1969). Nevertheless, some of the legislative history indicates a belief that detaining a defendant
because of “predicted—but as yet unconsummated—offense” was illegal. Federal Bail Procedures:
Hearing on S. 1357 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights and the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 3 (1965)
(statement of Sen. Ervin, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights).
40. In the section of the Act that governed “release in capital cases or after conviction,” judges
were expressly authorized to consider “danger to any other person or to the community” as a proper
element in setting bail in such cases. Pub. L. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214, 216. Thus, a person accused of a
capital offense and those who had been convicted of any offense and were appealing that conviction
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first time in American history that a law authorized a judge to consider
dangerousness as a legitimate reason to deny bail.41 By allowing
consideration of future dangerousness for a limited set of defendants, the
Act opened a new door. If judges could consider future dangerousness
for capital defendants, why not for other defendants, too? Were the
circumstances so different?42 By allowing judges to consider future
dangerousness for one set of defendants, the new law legitimated the
project of judicial predictions of dangerousness.43
C.

The 1970s and 1980s: Reversing Course to Address
“Dangerousness”

Shortly after these reforms arrived, the political consensus shifted
decisively in the opposite direction.44 Rising crime rates fed a perception
that earlier efforts had focused too much on the welfare of the accused,
and not enough on the welfare of the public.45 Commentators observed
or were awaiting sentencing could have their “danger to any other person or to the community”
considered at a bail hearing. Id.
41. Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 ARIZ. L.
REV. 909, 958 (2013).
42. For an even more foundational examination of this line of questioning, see Mayson, supra
note 24, at 497 (“One way to start thinking about what level of risk justifies restraint is to ask a
related question: is the answer different for defendants than for people not accused of any crime?”).
43. John B. Howard, The Trial of Pretrial Dangerousness: Preventive Detention after United
States v. Salerno, 75 VA. L. REV. 639, 645 (1989) (“Although some argued that the exception
simply recognized the unique temptation of the capital defendant to flee, others justified the
exception by pointing to the dangers to the community of releasing a capital defendant. This latter
argument, coupled with the view that bail is a statutory and not a constitutional right, formed the
foundation of the argument in favor of the constitutionality of preventive pretrial detention.”
(emphasis added)).
44. See COMM. ON CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH RATES OF INCARCERATION, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steven
Redburn eds., 2014) (“The unprecedented rise in incarceration rates can be attributed to an
increasingly punitive political climate surrounding criminal justice policy formed in a period of
rising crime and rapid social change.”).
45. The recidivism problem might have been overstated. See, e.g., J.W. LOCKE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T
OF COMMERCE, NAT’L BUREAU OF STANDARDS, COMPILATION AND USE OF CRIMINAL COURT
DATA IN RELATION TO PRE-TRIAL RELEASE OF DEFENDANTS: PILOT STUDY 2 (1970),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GOVPUB-C13-f5b5e5adeed0d6f0c7faf442cd8ee7d4/pdf/GOVPUB
-C13-f5b5e5adeed0d6f0c7faf442cd8ee7d4.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DEP-Z76R] (providing statistics
from a four-week period in 1968 in Washington D.C. showing that of 712 defendants who entered
the District of Columbia Criminal Justice System, 11% of those released charged with
misdemeanors or felonies were subsequently re-arrested on a second charge during the release
period). But this rate is not wildly out of line with today’s levels of recidivism upon release—it is
actually lower than what some jurisdictions experience today. See BRIAN REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 - STATISTICAL TABLES 15
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that crimes committed by individuals released pretrial remained a
significant problem,46 in spite of the 1966 reforms.47
Civil unrest during the mid-to-late 1960s played a critical role in
shifting perspectives.48 Across the country, prosecutors and courts
adopted ad hoc policies of preventive detention to “safeguard” the
community from further unrest.49 The 1968 Kerner Commission50 even
recommended that under emergency conditions like civil disorder, the
judiciary should have pretrial plans and procedures that “permit
separation of minor offenders from those dangerous to the community,
in order that serious offenders may be detained.”51 In many ways, the
(2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf [https://perma.cc/C29F-J93B] (showing
that nationally, 16% of released defendants were rearrested).
46. Here, the perception of pretrial recidivism mattered as much as—if not more than—reality. In
1969, Alan Dershowitz noted that the “net result of bail reform [from 1966] . . . has been that more
criminal defendants spend more time out on the street awaiting their trials than ever before. This has
led to an increase—or at least the appearance of an increase—in the number of crimes committed
by some of these defendants.” Alan M. Dershowitz, On ‘Preventive Detention’, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
Mar. 13, 1969, at 22 (emphasis added).
47. Miller, supra note 39, at 32.
48. Of course, civil unrest and disorder of the 1960s “helped foster a receptive environment for
political appeals for harsher criminal justice policies and laws.” COMM. ON CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH RATES OF INCARCERATION, supra note 44, at 115.
49. In fact, civil unrest during the mid-to-late 1960s played a direct role in these changes. The
12th Street Riot in Detroit, Michigan is an illustrative example. On July 23, 1967, police raided an
unlicensed speakeasy, where nearly 100 people were celebrating the return of two black servicemen
from Vietnam. Soon, a riot started, sparked by rumors of police abuse. The riot lasted for five days
and left forty-three people dead, over 1,000 injured, and more than 7,000 arrested. In response to the
disorder, Detroit’s public prosecutor stated that his office would ask for prohibitively high bonds on
all those arrested “so that even though they had not been adjudged guilty, we would eliminate the
danger of returning some of those who had caused the riot to the street during the time of stress.”
William A. Dobrovir, Preventive Detention: The Lesson of Civil Disorders, 15 VILL. L. REV. 313,
316–17 (1970) (citing Comment, The Administration of Justice in the Wake of the Detroit Civil
Disorders of July 1967, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1542, 1549–50 (1968)) (emphasis added). One Detroit
judge was quoted as saying that in cases like this, “[w]e will . . . allocate an extraordinary bond. We
must keep these people off the streets. We will keep them off.” Id. at 317; see also Criminal Justice
in Extremis: Administration of Justice During the April 1968 Chicago Disorder, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
455, 576 (1969). The April 1968 riots which dominated Washington D.C. also temporarily brought
a new standard for determining whether or not an arrestee should be released before trial: “whether
in the judge’s view he was likely to contribute to further disorder, to commit further offenses.”
Dobrovir, supra, at 322 (emphasis added).
50. The Kerner Commission, also known as the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders, was established by President Lyndon B. Johnson to investigate the underlying causes
behind the 1967 race riots in the United States. The Commission found that poverty and institutional
racism drove inner-city violence and called for aggressive federal spending to advance opportunities
in African-American communities. See NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., REPORT OF
THE
NATIONAL
ADVISORY
COMMISSION
ON
CIVIL
DISORDERS
(1968),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/8073NCjRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/373j-Ajy7].
51. Id. at 17.
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judicial response to the civil unrest of 1967 and 1968 not only further
normalized the task of predicting dangerousness, but also of preventive
detention more generally.
Against this backdrop, President Richard M. Nixon, elected in
November 1968, included in his “War on Crime” a call for “temporary
pretrial detention . . . [for people whose] pretrial release presents a clear
danger to the community.”52 Citing high-profile crimes committed in
D.C. and other cities by defendants released pretrial,53 the Nixon
administration played a key role in raising the issue’s profile.54 Of
course, the focus of Nixon’s campaign and administration was never
really on crime per se; race, more than anything, loomed large behind
Nixon’s “War on Crime.”55
In 1969, President Nixon’s Attorney General John Mitchell made the
public argument for the necessity of predictions of dangerousness and
preventive detention.56 Critically, he did so by drawing upon and
exploiting logic of the Bail Reform Act of 1966. For example, Mitchell
observed that the 1966 Act “specifically permits pretrial detention of
defendants who are charged with capital crimes and are considered
likely either to flee or pose a danger to the community.”57 Next, Mitchell
pointed out that no serious constitutional objection had been lodged
against the practice of predicting a capital defendant’s future
dangerousness. Finally, he noted that “objections to pretrial detention of
dangerous defendants on the ground that it is improper to confine those
not yet convicted apply with equal force to existing pretrial detention
practices—detention because of risk of flight or of dangerous capital
offense defendants.”58 Above all, Mitchell argued that society had an
equal right to assure that “those charged with noncapital but dangerous

52. Presidential Report, 27 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 212, 238 (1969) (statement by President Nixon).
53. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON CRIME IN D.C., REPORT ON THE METROPOLITAN POLICE
DEPARTMENT 523 (1966), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d02987368r;view=1
up;seq=1 (last visited Nov. 12, 2018).
54. KARL E. CAMPBELL & SAM ERVIN, LAST OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 217 (2007).
55. While the “southern strategy” is a historically problematic term, as both Republicans and
Democrats had associated blackness with criminality, Nixon’s southern strategy was unique in that
it “rested on politicizing the crime issue in a racially coded manner. Effectively politicizing crime
and other wedge issues—such as welfare—would require the use of a form of racial coding that did
not appear on its face to be at odds with the new norms of racial equality.” See COMM. ON CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH RATES OF INCARCERATION, supra note 44, at 116.
56. John N. Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. REV.
1223, 1240 (1969).
57. Id.
58. Id. (emphasis added).

08 - Koepke & Robinson (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

12/28/2018 4:27 PM

1740

[Vol. 93:1725

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

crimes will not expose the community to unreasonable risks of danger
prior to trial” and that, in making those predictions, “due process of law
requires fundamental fairness, not perfect accuracy.”59
Many objected to this line of argument,60 but Mitchell’s arguments
carried the day. Though the underlying philosophies motivating policy
change could not have been more different, Nixon-era reformers
exploited the logic and toolkit of reforms driven by civil rights leaders
for their own purposes.
Soon, a second generation of bail changes swept state and federal
courts, enlisting judges en masse in the work of predicting defendants’
dangerousness. The 1970 District of Columbia Court Reform and
Criminal Procedure Act61 (the D.C. Act) represented the first legislative
move in this second wave of reform efforts, reaching outside the context
of capital cases to allow “judges to detain a defendant pretrial without
setting any bail if the defendant was deemed dangerous to society.”62
The D.C. Act had an immediate impact across the country: within eight
years of its enactment, almost half of all states passed legislation
pointing to danger as a factor in bail decisions.63 By 1984, the number of
laws passed had grown to thirty-four.64 Four states—Nebraska and
Texas in 1977, Michigan in 1978, and Wisconsin in 1981—amended
their state constitutions to allow denial of bail to defendants deemed to
be dangerous.65 Meanwhile, at the national level, a progression of
Supreme Court cases—including Jurek v. Texas,66 Bell v. Wolfish,67
59. Id. at 1241–42.
60. The American Bar Association argued that courts could not “with any degree of tolerable
accuracy predict in advance the defendants who will commit a further crime.” ABA Opposes
Preventive Detention in Congressional Testimony, 1 ABA SEC. INDIVIDUAL RTS. & RESPS. NEWSL.
4 (1969). An ABA committee considering the issue expressed “serious misgivings” on the
proposals, noting that the “purpose of bail is to insure the defendant’s presence at the time of trial.”
William H. Erickson, The Standards of Criminal Justice in a Nutshell, 32 LA. L. REV. 369, 377
(1972). Laurence Tribe and other scholars replied in part that a scheme authorizing pretrial
detention based on future danger “has all the vices inherent in a law that makes the crime fit the
criminal.” Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John
Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 375, 392 (1970).
61. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358,
84 Stat. 473.
62. Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 504
(2012).
63. Id. at 506.
64. Id.
65. Donald B. Jr. Verrilli, Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical
Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 353–54 (1982).
66. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
67. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).

08 - Koepke & Robinson (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

12/28/2018 4:27 PM

RISK ASSESSMENT AND THE FUTURE OF BAIL REFORM

1741

Barefoot v. Estelle,68 and Schall v. Martin69—led the Court to bless
predictions of dangerousness, and approve the pretrial detention of
allegedly dangerous defendants, even when they did not pose a flight
risk.70
The Reagan administration, with overwhelming Democratic support,
pushed these changes further, relying on similar tactics and rhetoric as
the Nixon administration.71 The eventual 1984 Bail Reform Act became
68. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
69. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
70. Jurek v. Texas did not involve bail or pretrial detention. 428 U.S. at 262. In upholding the
Texas death penalty statute, the Supreme Court concluded that predictions of dangerousness are “an
essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system. The
decision whether to admit a defendant to bail, for instance, must often turn on a judge’s prediction
of the defendant’s future conduct.” Id. at 275. Importantly, the Court observed that though “[i]t is,
of course, not easy to predict future behavior,” the “fact that such a determination is difficult,
however, does not mean that it cannot be made.” Id. at 274–75. Bell v. Wolfish considered the
conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in
New York City. 441 U.S. at 539. In finding that the MCC’s conditions of confinement did not
infringe on a pretrial detainee’s constitutional rights, the Court held that, as one scholar puts it, “due
process only requires that pretrial detainees be free from ‘punishment,’ rather than from a restraint
of liberty.” Baradaran, supra note 9, at 744. The Court noted that punishment does not exist pretrial
if an action is “reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 539.
“[I]n addition to ensuring the detainees’ presence at trial, [other objectives] may justify [the]
imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any inference that such
restrictions are intended as punishment.” Id. at 440. In Barefoot, the Court authorized contentious
expert testimony about dangerousness in a capital case, further illustrating a growing openness
toward predictions of future criminality. 463 U.S. at 916. Schall upheld a New York state statute
that authorized the preventive detention of juvenile delinquents. 467 U.S. at 253. Echoing the
sentiments of Jurek, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that, “from a legal point of view there is nothing
inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct” and that the Court had
“specifically rejected the contention . . . ‘that it is impossible to predict future behavior and that the
question is so vague as to be meaningless.’” Id. at 278–79 (citation omitted). And though the Court
had previously left open the question as to whether any government objective other than ensuring a
pretrial detainee’s presence at trial could survive constitutional scrutiny, the Court in Schall
definitively closed the door. “Preventive detention [under the statute] serves the legitimate state
objective, held in common with every State in the country, of protecting both the juvenile and
society from the hazards of pretrial crime.” Id. at 274. In other words, in Schall, the Court for the
first time held that pretrial detention based on objective other than ensuring a defendant’s
appearance at trial passed constitutional muster.
71. For example, the case for bail reform in the 1980s rested on the familiar perception that the
rate of pretrial recidivism was “extremely high,” despite strong contradictory evidence. See
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983: Hearing on S. 829 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 285, 286 (1983) (statement of LeRoy S.
Zimmerman, National Association of Attorneys General) (testifying that because “the rate of
recidivism for individuals released on bail is extremely high, consideration must be given to the
dangerousness of the defendant and the risk to the community should he be released on bail pending
trial”); H.R. REP. NO. 98-1121, at 11 (1984); Bail Reform Act of 1981–82: Hearing on H.R. 3006,
H.R. 4264, and H.R. 4362 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 87 (1981) (prepared statement of Guy
Willetts, Chief of the Pretrial Services Branch, Division of Probation, Administrative Offices of the
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law with broad support.72 It “made public safety a central concern in the
judicial officer’s choice [among] . . . pretrial custody options.”73 For the
first time at the federal level,74 judges were asked to predict the danger a
defendant’s release posed to the community.75 By 1984,
“dangerousness” was included as a factor in bail decisions under federal
law and in nearly two-thirds of the states.
But these laws suffered from a common problem: how to define
“danger.” Clues from the federal law pointed to a fairly broad definition
of what judges could consider. For example, the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary’s report noted that “the risk that a defendant will continue
to engage in [drug] trafficking constitutes a danger to the ‘safety of any
other person or the community.’”76 Even the risk of non-violent crimes,
such as those against property, satisfied this expansive “danger”
standard. State laws also consistently failed to provide specific standards
to determine whether a defendant was “dangerous.”77
Despite these deficiencies, in 1987, the Supreme Court upheld the
Bail Reform Act of 1984 as constitutional, and in turn, sanctioned
preventive detention and predictions of dangerousness pretrial.78 In
United States v. Salerno,79 the Court held that the Eighth Amendment
does not grant an individual an absolute right to bail, that the denial of
bail on the basis of dangerousness does not violate the Eighth
Amendment, and that pretrial detention was a regulatory act, not
United States Courts) (testifying that in a sample of ten jurisdictions, “new crimes committed by
federal offenders released on bail occurred at a rate of 8.4 percent”).
72. Stuart Taylor Jr., Senate Approves an Anticrime Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1984 (“The Senate
today passed a bipartisan package that supporters call the most significant Federal anticrime
measure in more than a decade. The vote was 91 to 1.”).
73. Goldkamp, supra note 10, at 42.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 158–59 (3d. Cir. 1986) (“The 1984 Act
marks a radical departure from former federal bail policy. Prior to the 1984 Act, consideration of a
defendant’s dangerousness in a pretrial release decision was permitted only in capital
cases . . . . Under the new statute judicial officers must now consider danger to the community in all
cases in setting conditions of release.” (emphasis added)).
75. Notably, the legislative history of the 1984 law demonstrates that Congress clearly understood
they were transforming the fundamental premise of bail. See, e.g., Curtis E. Karnow, Setting Bail
for Public Safety, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 7 (2008).
76. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 103 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3196, 1983.
77. Goldkamp, supra note 10, at 17–18. (“Over one-third of the public safety-oriented laws
provide no definition of danger. . . . In approximately half of the states with explicit references, the
definition of danger is vague.”)
78. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“In our society, liberty is the norm, and
detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception. We hold that the provisions
for pretrial detention in the Bail Reform Act of 1984 fall within that carefully limited exception.”).
79. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
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punishment.80 In just over two decades, the predictive task of a bail
hearing was fundamentally transformed. By 1987, states were passing
laws mandating that “public safety be the primary [predictive]
consideration” at a bail hearing.81
Throughout this period, conservative-minded reformers publicly
argued that their set of bail reforms would make bail more honest by
eliminating sub rosa detention through high bail. But more than three
decades later, “after federal and state statutes were rewritten . . . [to]
permi[t] judges to order dangerous defendants to be detained, money
bail is still used as a back-door means to manage dangerousness.”82
In fact, what began in the mid-1960s as an effort to reduce povertybased detention ended in the mid-1980s with a law that led to immediate
and lasting increases in pretrial detention.83 Bail reform’s pivot in the
late 1960s from a focus on unnecessary pretrial detention, to a focus on
widespread prediction of dangerousness, took a mere two years.
Critically, this pivot relied on law and order reformers successfully
subverting the logic and tools of previous liberal reform efforts. That
current reform efforts bear striking similarities to those discussed here
should caution liberal reformers.84
II.

BAIL IN PRACTICE TODAY

Across the country, after someone is arrested, they appear at a bail
hearing. Sometimes the accused appears in court via videoconference
from jail. Other times, the accused, en masse, sit in a makeshift
courtroom in a jail for their arraignment. Specific practices vary widely
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Nevertheless, at bail, the law generally

80. Id. at 753–55 (rejecting “the proposition that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits
the government from pursuing other admittedly compelling interests through regulation of pretrial
release” and noting that “when Congress has mandated detention on the basis of a compelling
interest other than prevention of flight, as it has here, the Eighth Amendment does not require
release on bail”).
81. Karnow, supra note 75, at 8.
82. Gouldin, supra note 23, at 863.
83. The U.S. Marshals Service found that there was “a 32 percent increase in prisoner
population . . . during the first year after its passage.” John Riley, Preventive Detention Use
Grows—But Is It Fair?, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 24, 1986, at 1. Three years later, a General Accounting
Office report found that the 1984 Bail Reform Act led to a “greater percentage of defendants
remain[ing] incarcerated during their pretrial period under the new law than under the [1966] law.”
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-88-6, CRIMINAL BAIL: HOW BAIL REFORM IS
WORKING IN SELECTED DISTRICT COURTS 18 (1987) https://www.gao.gov/assets/150/145896.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K8QE-6CV2].
84. See infra section II.C.
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asks a judge to assess the risk that a defendant will flee the jurisdiction,
or whether the defendant would pose a danger to the community if
released. The judge is asked to order the least restrictive set of
conditions needed to ensure the defendant appears at future court dates
and does not harm the community in the meantime.85
If a judge predicts, or a bail schedule requires, that no feasible
combination of conditions could adequately ensure the defendant’s
appearance for their trial, nor protect public safety, then that individual
is non-bailable, or not eligible for release before trial. These defendants
will be remanded to custody and will wait in jail until their trial or other
resolution of their case. On the other hand, if a judge believes that the
defendant will appear for trial and does not think the defendant will be a
danger to the community if released, or believes that some set of
conditions would ensure these criteria, then that individual is bailable
and eligible for some form of pretrial release. Complicating matters, in
some jurisdictions a judge is constrained by a bail schedule, where
certain crimes merit certain statutorily determined conditions.
There are three basic approaches to release:
Release on personal recognizance (sometimes called “ROR”): The
defendant promises to reappear for his or her future court dates with no
judicially imposed restrictions or conditions.86
Conditional release: The defendant is released with non-monetary
conditions, such as a requirement to check in with a pretrial services
agency, undergo drug treatment, or wear a GPS monitoring anklet.87
Release on bond: A set financial obligation is defined that the
defendant will have to pay if she fails to return to court when required. A
secured bond means the defendant must pay the amount up front in order
to be released from jail, while an unsecured bond means that the
defendant is released without paying but will become liable for the
defined amount if she fails to appear in the future.88

85. Again, practices can vary widely across jurisdictions. We only generalize the process for the
sake of clarity.
86. See, e.g., WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(a) (“Any person, other than a person charged with a
capital offense, shall at the preliminary appearance or reappearance . . . be ordered released on the
accused’s personal recognizance pending trial unless [one of several factors is met].”).
87. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT § 135.230(d) (2017) (“‘Conditional release’ means a nonsecurity
release which imposes regulations on the activities and associations of the defendant.”).
88. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-123(2a), (3) (2018) (“[A]ny judicial officer may impose any
one or any combination of the following conditions of release: . . . Require the execution of an
unsecured bond; [or] [r]equire the execution of a secure bond which at the option of the accused
shall be satisfied with sufficient solvent sureties, or the deposit of cash in lieu thereof.”).
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Judges can also combine an offer of conditional release with a
financial bond. Even when a judge sets a condition of release, the
defendant still may not be freed before trial. For example, when a
secured bond amount is set, the defendant remains in jail unless and until
that money is given to the authorities. Many jurisdictions abide by a “10
percent” rule, where defendants only need to post 10% of a bond to
secure their release that day. Funds can come from the defendant
directly, from a friend, relative or community member, from a bail fund,
or from a commercial bail bondsman (more on that below). But across
the country, low income defendants struggle and are often unable to
raise the necessary funds. Even though a judge has approved a path for
their release, they remain in jail.
A.

Motivations for Reform

Bail decisions can upend people’s lives. Before a trial has begun,
without any finding of guilt, a judge may nonetheless deprive the
defendant of her liberty, or impose a range of other burdens, during the
weeks, months, or years that may pass until guilt or innocence is finally
determined. Those who are denied bail, or who are offered it on terms
they cannot afford, must stay in jail until trial. While they wait, they
often lose their jobs, face eviction from their homes, and otherwise
watch their lives crumble.
Pretrial detention plays a central role in America’s globally
extraordinary patterns of incarceration. On any given day in the United
States, more than 400,000 individuals are detained and awaiting trial.89
The total population estimated to be in local jails nationally is up about
20% since 2000, and 95% of that growth is attributable to people
awaiting trial.90
Two specific motivations deserve to be highlighted. First, the
longstanding ills of money bail remain. Inability to pay bail is the
primary reason why pretrial defendants stay in jail until the disposition
of their cases.91 Compounding the problem, the proportion of felony

89. TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2014,
at 3 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9P3-KCR5].
90. Id. at 4.
91. The most recent statewide data available shows that 38% of felony defendants in the largest
seventy-five counties were detained until the end of their case. Of that group, about 90% were
detained because they were unable to meet the financial conditions offered for release. The
percentages are essentially the same for felony defendants in state courts, too. REAVES, supra
note 45; see also THOMAS COHEN & BRIAN REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF

08 - Koepke & Robinson (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

12/28/2018 4:27 PM

1746

[Vol. 93:1725

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

defendants subject to some financial condition for their release has
skyrocketed.92
Second, and relatedly, the human cost of pretrial detention is
staggering. A growing body of research indicates that pretrial detention
itself directly increases the probability of worse case outcomes for the
defendant—meaning a guilty plea or conviction at trial.93 Further, recent
research shows that pretrial detention worsens the risks that judges aim
to predict. That is, pretrial detention itself leads to higher rates of pretrial
rearrests, more failures to appear, and greater long-term recidivism than
the same defendants would have shown if immediately released.94 This
finding has significant import for our core thesis, discussed in
sections III.B.2 and B.3.
B.

The Shape of Current Reforms: Away from Money, Toward Risk

Today’s reform efforts mark what some call the third generation of
bail reform.95 The pace of reform is rapid, and the shape of reforms is
varied. A central goal of most of these efforts is to end the wealth-based
system, and move pretrial justice systems toward a risk-based model.96

FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 2 (2007), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NZ9N-XACT].
92. From 1990 to 2009, the overall percentage of felony cases involving some sort of financial
condition for release rose from just over one-third to nearly two-thirds of all releases. Meanwhile,
the fraction of outright releases (without conditions) declined apace. See REAVES, supra note 45.
93. KRISTIAN LUM & MIKE BAIOCCHI, THE SAUSAL IMPACT OF BAIL ON CASE OUTCOMES FOR
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS 1 (July 15, 2017) (“It has long been observed that those who are detained
pre-trial are more likely to be convicted, but only recently have formal causal inference methods
been brought to bear on the problem of determining whether pre-trial detention causes a higher
likelihood of conviction. In each case where causal inference methods were used, a statistically
significant effect was found.” (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted)); id. at 4 (“We find a strong
causal relationship between setting bail and the outcome of a case . . . for cases for which different
judges could come to different decisions regarding whether bail should be set, setting bail results in
a 34% increase in the chances that they will be found guilty.”); see also EMILY LESLIE & NOLAN G.
POPE, THE UNINTENDED IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION ON CASE OUTCOMES: EVIDENCE FROM
NYC ARRAIGNMENTS (2016); MEGAN STEVENSON, DISTORTION OF JUSTICE: HOW INABILITY TO
PAY AFFECTS CASE OUTCOMES (2016).
94. See Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. (2017); CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, MARIE
VANNOSTRAND & ALEXANDER HOLSINGER, LAURA AND JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., THE HIDDEN
COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION (2013); Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman & Ethan Frenchman,
The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization, 45 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 3 (2016).
95. Timothy R. Schnacke, Claire M.B. Brooker & Michael R. Jones, The Third Generation of
Bail Reform, DEN. L. REV. ONLINE (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.denverlawreview.org/dlronlinearticle/2011/3/14/the-third-generation-of-bail-reform.html [https://perma.cc/N64N-6PSY].
96. SCHNACKE, supra note 16, at 36.
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In many states, legislatures are the first movers of reform. Since 2012,
over 500 bills across all fifty states were enacted related to pretrial
justice, including financial and non-financial conditions for release,
pretrial services and supervision, diversion programs, citation in lieu of
arrest, and victim support and services.97 In 2016, forty-four states
enacted nearly 120 laws related to pretrial administration.98 Almost twothirds of those states enacted some sort of law related specifically to
pretrial diversion.99
Twelve states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government
have enacted a statutory presumption that defendants charged with
bailable offenses be released on personal recognizance or unsecured
bond “unless a judicial officer makes an individual determination that
the defendant poses a risk that requires more restrictive conditions or
detention.”100 Six more states have done so by court rule.101
Recent legislation also directly targets money bail. In June 2017,
Connecticut passed legislation that barred “cash-only” bail for certain
crimes and prohibits courts from imposing a financial condition of
release on defendants charged with only a misdemeanor crime.102 New
Jersey’s comprehensive bail reforms took effect in January 2017,
virtually eliminating cash bail across the state.103 Illinois enacted
legislation in June 2017 that requires judges to use the least restrictive
conditions to assure a defendant’s appearance, with a presumption that
any conditions of release would be non-monetary.104 In early 2017, New
97. TRENDS IN PRETRIAL RELEASE 2017, supra note 6.
98. TRENDS IN PRETRIAL RELEASE 2018, supra note 6, at 5.
99. Id.
100.
ARTHUR W. PEPIN, CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, 2012-2013 POLICY PAPER
EVIDENCE-BASED
PRETRIAL
RELEASE
3
(2012),
https://cosca.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/COSCA/Policy%20Papers/Evidence%20Based%20
Pre-Trial%20Release%20-Final.ashx [https://perma.cc/BTM3-YPYG].
101. Id.
102. An Act Concerning Pretrial Justice Reform, 2017 Conn. Acts 716 (Reg. Sess.). Three
exceptions exist to the new misdemeanor release rule: if (1) person is charged with a family
violence crime, (2) if a person requests such conditions, or (3) court makes a finding on the record
that there is a likely risk that the arrested person will fail to appear in court, will obstruct or attempt
to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure or intimidate or attempt to threaten, injure or intimidate a
prospective witness or juror, or the arrested person will engage in conduct that threatens the safety
of himself or herself or another person. Id.
103. Act of Aug. 11, 2014, ch. 31, 2014 N.J. Laws 467.
104. Bail Reform Act of 2017, No. 100-1, 2017 Ill. Legis. Serv. (West). The law also allows the
state supreme court to establish a pretrial risk assessment tool, but does not require it. The state’s
Administrative Office of the Courts already indicated its support for pretrial risk assessment, as did
the Illinois Supreme Court in a statewide policy statement. See Illinois Supreme Court Adopts
Statewide Policy Statement for Pretrial Services, ILL. ST. BAR ASS’N: ILL. LAW. NOW (May 1,
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Orleans’s City Council passed an ordinance eliminating cash bail for
defendants charged with minor, non-violent crimes.105 A new rule
promulgated by Maryland’s Court of Appeals that instructs judges to
first look to non-financial conditions of release went into effect on July
1, 2017, after the legislators in the state failed to pass new legislation
before their session ended.106 Atlanta’s City Council passed an ordinance
eliminating a cash bond requirement for low-level offenses107; Alaska
enacted new reforms that eliminate money bail for most defendants108;
and multiple New York City district attorneys have ordered prosecutors
not to request money bail in most cases.109
Among the most popular reforms are policies that introduce or expand
pretrial services and, at the same time, either introduce or expand
actuarial risk assessment. Since 2012, at least twenty laws in fourteen
states either created or standardized the use of pretrial risk assessment.110
In 2014 alone, eleven laws were passed to regulate how risk assessment
tools were used pretrial. Almost half of the states that passed laws
relating to pretrial services between 2012 and 2014 authorized or created
statewide pretrial service programs.111 Cities and counties across the
country have experimented with pretrial risk assessment—some develop
their own tools, while others implement or purchase another tool.112
Among policymakers, actuarial tools enjoy broad support across the
political spectrum. The American Bar Association specifically
recommends that judges use actuarial models in making bail
2017),
https://www.isba.org/iln/2017/05/01/illinois-supreme-court-adopts-statewide-policystatement-pretrial-services [https://perma.cc/TS5K-XM23].
105. Jessica Williams, City Council Unanimously Passes Overhaul to Municipal Court Bail
System: Fewer Defendants Will Have to Post Bail, NEW ORLEANS ADVOC. (Jan. 12, 2017),
http://www.theadvocate.com/new_orleans/news/courts/article_eb41d288-d90b-11e6-b99c4bb3e5442d1b.html [https://perma.cc/BFP9-E8NJ].
106. Michael Dresser, Maryland Court of Appeals: Defendants Can’t Be Held in Jail Because
They
Can’t
Afford
Bail,
BALT.
SUN
(Feb.
8,
2017),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-bail-rule-20170207-story.html
[https://perma.cc/VC79-G8LD].
107. Rhonda Cook, Atlanta Mayor Signs New Ordinance Changing Cash Bail System in a Nod to
the
Needy,
ATLANTA-J.
CONST.:
MYAJC,
(Feb.
5,
2018),
https://www.myajc.com/news/local/atlanta-council-oks-changes-cash-bail-system-nod-theneedy/SW50dABJAtWgBwpB4vtgBN/ [https://perma.cc/XF8M-JPMZ].
108. Senate Bill 91: Summary of Policy Reforms, ALASKA JUST. F., Spring 2016, at 1, 2–4.
109. James C. McKinley Jr., Some Prosecutors Stop Asking for Bail in Minor Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
(Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/09/nyregion/bail-prosecutors-new-york.html (last
visited Nov. 12, 2018).
110. WIDGERY, supra note 6, at 1.
111. Id. at 3.
112. Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 442 (2016).
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determinations.113 A cohort of prominent public defense and criminal
defense groups recently called for “the use of validated pretrial risk
assessment in all jurisdictions, as a necessary component of a fair
pretrial release system.”114 The National Association of Counties
recently adopted a resolution calling on the U.S. Department of Justice
to advise state and county governments to adopt pretrial risk assessment
and eliminate commercially secured bonds.115 The Conference of State
Court Administrators (COSCA)116 and the Conference of Chief Justices
have both called for the use of risk assessment.117
Most notably, during the time in which this Article was being edited,
California passed, and its governor signed, Senate Bill 10 into law.118
The law completely eliminates California’s money bail system,
replacing it with a system based on risk assessment.119 Despite
significant, looming implementation hurdles—including a proposed
referendum to repeal it120—the law is scheduled to take effect October 1,
2019.121
113. ABA, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE 5–6 (3d ed. 2007) (see
standard 10.1.10 discussing the role of the pretrial services agency in determining release eligibility
for defendants).
114. GIDEON’S PROMISE ET AL., supra note 7, at 4. The groups involved included the American
Council of Chief Defenders, Gideon’s Promise, the National Association for Public Defense, the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the National Legal Aid and Defenders
Association. See id. at 1.
115. NAT’L ASSOC. OF CTYS., ADOPTED INTERIM POLICY RESOLUTIONS 11 (2017),
http://www.naco.org/ [https://perma.cc/22YU-LKM6] (explaining the policy resolution on
improving the pretrial justice process).
116. PEPIN, supra note 100.
117. CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, ENDORSING THE CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT
ADMINISTRATORS POLICY PAPER ON EVIDENCE-BASED PRETRIAL RELEASE (2013),
https://ccj.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CCJ/Resolutions/01302013-pretrial-release-EndorsingCOSCA-Paper-EvidenceBased-Pretrial-Release.ashx [https://perma.cc/9656-249H] (adopting the
policy as proposed by the CCJ/COSCA Criminal Justice Committee at the Conference of Chief
Justices midyear meeting).
118. Act of Aug. 28, 2018, ch. 244, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West) (S.B. 10).
119. The California Judicial Council is statutorily tasked with “[c]ompil[ing] and maintain[ing] a
list of validated pretrial risk assessment tools” that jurisdictions may use. Id. § 1320.24(e)(1).
According to the law, a validated risk assessment tool is one that “shall be demonstrated by
scientific research to be accurate and reliable in assessing the risk of a person failing to appear in
court as required or the risk to public safety due to the commission of a new criminal offense if the
person is released before adjudication of his or her current criminal offense and minimize bias.” Id.
§ 1320.7(k).
120. Bob Egelko, Bail Bond Companies Gathering Signatures for Referendum to Keep Them in
Business,
S.F.
CHRONICLE
(Sep.
11,
2018,
6:10
PM),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/Bail-bond-companies-seek-to-block-new-law-that13221653.php [https://perma.cc/CZ9U-LYMK].
121. Act of Aug. 28, 2018, ch. 244, § 1320.6, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West) (S.B. 10).
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However, a growing chorus of advocates have begun to raise some
objections. For example, Human Rights Watch argues that pretrial risk
assessment tools should be opposed “entirely.”122 Over a hundred
community and advocacy groups in New York recently argued that
pretrial risk assessment tools will “further exacerbate racial bias in [the]
criminal justice system” and that the tools will “likely lead to increases
in pretrial detention in the state.”123 And a broad range of more than 100
civil rights, social justice, and digital rights groups declared that risk
assessment instruments should not be used pretrial.124 Those same
groups detail six principles that any pretrial risk assessment tool must
follow “in order to ameliorate the strong dangers and risks we see in the
implementation of risk assessment instruments.”125
Early evidence on the impact of risk assessment is limited, but the
nascent findings are troubling. A recent study of Kentucky’s bail
reforms by Megan Stevenson found that a new risk assessment tool and
other policy reforms “led to only a trivial increase in pretrial release”
and, simultaneously, “an uptick in failures-to-appear (FTAs) and pretrial
crime; a disappointing counter to hopes that all three margins could be
improved simultaneously.”126
III. THE CHALLENGES OF PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT
Despite pretrial risk assessment’s broad and enthusiastic adoption,
there are significant reasons for caution. Some of these reasons are
underappreciated in the public debate. Existing skepticism about the
adoption of pretrial risk assessment tools centers on concerns of racial

122. John Raphling, Human Rights Watch Advises Against Using Profile-Based Risk Assessment
in Bail Reform, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jul. 17, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/17/humanrights-watch-advises-against-using-profile-based-risk-assessment-bail-reform
[https://perma.cc/V6ZH-2JLM].
123. Letter from Over 100 Cmty. & Advocacy Grps. Across N.Y. State to Governor Cuomo
(Nov. 2017), http://bds.org/wp-content/uploads/Bail-Reform-Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3P5ZJAX] (discussing bail reform in New York).
124. THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS, THE USE OF PRETRIAL “RISK
ASSESSMENT” INSTRUMENTS: A SHARED STATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNS, (2018)
[hereinafter
LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE
SHARED
STATEMENT],
http://civilrightsdocs.
info/pdf/criminal-justice/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/DK2Q-8LY3].
125. Id. at 2.
126. Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018) (manuscript at 5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3016088 (last visited
Nov. 12, 2018).
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bias and on due process inequities, both of which are substantial
concerns.127
Though these debates are incredibly important, they have contributed
to a lack of discussion of a more basic tension between statistical
prediction and bail reform. On the one hand, to change a broken system,
policymakers enact and implement policies that work to reduce the risk
of rearrest and failure to appear. On the other hand, policymakers ask
statistical tools to forecast those very same risks based on data from the
very system under reform.128 As a result, without the right conditions
and policies, risk assessment tools will typically be blind to the helpful
impact of the very changes that reformers seek to introduce.
In this Part, we first describe how actuarial risk assessment tools
work.
127. In particular, ProPublica’s assertion that COMPAS risk assessment tool was “biased against
blacks” stimulated much of this research. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May
23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/2C6W-5978]. COMPAS’s creator claims that their risk assessment tool is fair
because it maintains “predictive parity”—meaning that defendants with the same risk score are
equally likely to reoffend. For example, in Broward County, Florida, 60% of white and 61% of
black defendants assigned a risk score of seven actually reoffended. See WILLIAM DIETERICH ET
AL., NORTHPOINTE INC. RESEARCH DEP’T, COMPAS RISK SCALES: DEMONSTRATING ACCURACY
EQUITY
AND
PREDICTIVE
PARITY
(2016),
http://go.volarisgroup.com/rs/430-MBX989/images/ProPublica_Commentary_Final_070616.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6X6-W4D2]. However,
among defendants who ultimately did not reoffend, black defendants were twice as likely as white
defendants to receive a medium or high risk score. Further, white defendants who subsequently
reoffended had lower average risk scores than their black counterparts. Essentially, black defendants
were over-classified as risky and unnecessarily subjected to harsher scrutiny. See Julia Angwin et
al., ProPublica Responds to Company’s Critique of Machine Bias Story, PROPUBLICA (Jul 29,
2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/propublica-responds-to-companys-critique-of-machinebias-story [https://perma.cc/JK4Z-D6YW]. The lesson of the ProPublica piece, however, is that this
result is inevitable. Where there is a divergent base rate (on average, black defendants recidivate at
higher rates) and predictive tools like COMPAS must maintain predictive parity (to pass statistical
muster), a predictive algorithm cannot satisfy both fairness criteria (predictive parity and equalized
false positive and negative rates) simultaneously. See Jon Kleinberg et al., Inherent Trade-Offs in
the Fair Determination of Risk Scores, ARXIV (Nov. 17, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.05807.pdf
[https://perma.cc/75NX-7PL9]. COMPAS is also at the center of another debate: due process. In
Loomis v. Wisconsin, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 2290
(2017) (mem.), the question presented by the petitioner, Eric Loomis, was whether or not “it [is] a
violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to due process for a trial court to rely on [proprietary]
risk assessment results at sentencing: (a) because the proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents a
defendant from challenging the accuracy and scientific validity of the risk assessment; and
(b) because COMPAS assessments take gender and race into account in formulating the risk
assessment?” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Loomis, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (No. 16-6387).
128. See Gil Rothschild-Elyassi, Johann Koehler & Jonathan Simon, Actuarial Justice, in THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CONTROL (Mathieu Deflem ed., 2019) 194–206; see also id. at 203 (noting,
along similar lines, a “special twist to actuarial justice’s legitimacy puzzle: the very system that
produced an outcome as illegitimate as mass incarceration must simultaneously be treated as
legitimate in producing the data on which actuarial justice-based reform efforts must rely”).
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Section III.B illustrates how current pretrial risk assessment tools will
likely make “zombie predictions,” where old data, reflecting outdated
bail practices, are newly reanimated. To do so, the Article focuses
specifically on two popular strains of reform: creating or expanding
pretrial services and limiting or eliminating cash bail—describing in turn
why those reforms are likely to significantly change the risks that risk
assessment tools seek to forecast.
Section III.C examines the underappreciated role of decision-making
frameworks, and the risks associated with their creation. These are
matrices, akin to bail schedules, that attach a proposed course of action
for a judge to a risk assessment score. When defendants are
systematically regarded as riskier than they truly are, today’s decisionmaking frameworks may unnecessarily subject defendants to overly
burdensome, and perhaps counterproductive, conditions of release. As a
result, risk assessment tools and the accompanying decision-making
frameworks may actually erode the benefits of risk-reducing bail
reforms.
Finally, section III.D explores the long-term dangers that pretrial risk
assessment tools pose to bail reform and pretrial jurisprudence more
generally. Pretrial risk assessment tools may further legitimize and
expand preventive detention. As a result, there is good reason to
reexamine whether United States v. Salerno was rightly decided. Even
assuming that Salerno was properly decided, the case nevertheless left
open significant questions that will have to be resolved—questions that
the widespread adoption of pretrial risk assessment make all the more
urgent.
A.

How Pretrial Risk Assessment Works

Typically, risk assessment tools use data about groups of people, like
those who have been arrested or convicted, to assess the probability of
future behavior. The creator of an actuarial tool may test hundreds of
variables, like a previous failure to appear or age at current arrest, to
determine which factors when weighed together are most predictive of
rearrest and failure to appear.
Although these tools are frequently drawn into broader debates about
machine learning or artificial intelligence,129 they typically rely on
129. See, e.g., CHELSEA BARABAS ET AL., INTERVENTIONS OVER PREDICTIONS: REFRAMING THE
ETHICAL DEBATE FOR ACTUARIAL RISK ASSESSMENT 4 (2017) (“Notwithstanding the popular
discourse on the ethical use of risk assessments, the vast majority of these tools do not use new
statistical methods frequently associated with ‘artificial intelligence,’ such as machine learning.
They are overwhelmingly based on regression models.”).
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longer-established statistical methods, like regression analysis.130 Often
the fact or manner of their use is new, rather than the techniques
employed in their creation.131
Tools vary in the kind and numbers of factors they use. Each included
factor gets a weighting that reflects how strongly it correlates with
rearrest or failure to appear.132 For example, historical data might show
that defendants who are under the age of thirty when arrested are much
more likely to be rearrested or fail to appear, compared to defendants
who are over thirty at the time of arrest.133 Accordingly, if person is
under the age of thirty when arrested, that person might be assigned
three points. Conversely, a person over thirty might be assigned a single
point. The greater the numerical value, the more that variable is
correlated with worse outcomes.134
When completing a risk assessment, either a human, a computer, or
some mix of the two will determine the applicable variables and
calculate the total risk score. Those risk scores are then transformed into
risk categories or scales. For example, a tool might sort defendants into
“low risk,” “moderate risk,” “high risk.”
130. Id. at 3–4 (“Regression modeling is particularly well-suited for prediction oriented
assessment, because it enables researchers to identify variables that are predictive of an outcome of
interest, without necessarily having to understand why that factor is significant.”); id. (“Regression
analysis is widely used for purposes of forecasting future events. The main goal of regression is to
identify a set of variables that are predictive of a given outcome variable. This is achieved by
determining the optimal weights for a given set of covariates, ones that are best predictive of the
outcome variable of interest. This is done through processes called model checking and selection,
whereby statistical tests are run on each covariate to see how significantly predictive they are of the
outcome variable.”).
131. There is a thriving debate about how and where the recent growth of machine learning
methods (sometimes broadly termed “AI”) should stimulate changes to legal doctrine or public
administration. Most of those questions are not (yet) presented in the pretrial context. It is unclear
whether these newer technologies should really be seen by the law as something significantly new
or different. See, e.g., Richard Berk & Justin Bleich, Statistical Procedures for Forecasting
Criminal Behavior: A Comparative Assessment, 12 CRIM. & PUB. POL’Y 513 (2013) (arguing that,
after comparing various methods, “[t]here seems to be no reason for continuing to rely on traditional
forecasting tools such as logistic regression”); Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot:
Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147 (2017); Paul
Ohm & David Lehr, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine
Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653–717 (2017).
132. See generally CYNTHIA A. MAMALIAN, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF
PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT (2011).
133. See, e.g., PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST. & JFA INST., THE COLORADO PRETRIAL ASSESSMENT
TOOL 16 (2012), https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?
DocumentFileKey=64908e23-bf3e-9379-1a1f-f2d5b9e1702f&forceDialog=0
[https://perma.cc/64BL-NUF2].
134. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Skeem & John Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk
Assessment, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 38, 39 (2011).
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The Colorado Pretrial Assessment Tool (CPAT) offers an accessible
example.135
Table 1:
Risk Scores and Relevant Statistics136
Revised
Risk
Category

Risk Score

Public
Safety Rate

1
2
3
4
Average

0–17
18–37
38–50
51–82
30

91%
80%
69%
58%
78%

Court
Overall
Appearance Combined
Rate
Success
Rate
95%
87%
85%
71%
77%
58%
51%
33%
82%
68%

In the above example, risk scores are sorted into four categories.
Those categories represent the rate of rearrest and/or failure to appear.
For example, a defendant who has a score of 39 falls into Category 3.
Placement into that category means that, as a group, defendants assessed
as similar to the current defendant were rearrested 31% of the time and
failed to appear 23% of the time.137

135. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST. & JFA INST., supra note 133, at 18 tbl.2.
136. Id. at 18.
137. Id. at 15 fig.2.
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Figure 1:
Pretrial Misconduct Rates138

B.

Zombie Predictions

Pretrial risk assessment tools developed on data that does not reflect
changing ground realities as a result of risk-mitigating reforms will
likely make “zombie predictions.”139 That is, the predictions of such a
pretrial risk assessment tool may reanimate and give new life to old data
and outcomes from a bail system that is presently under reform. Below,
we detail the intersection between two common bail reforms, expanding
pretrial services and cabining money bail, and zombie predictions. We
finish by examining how such zombie predictions might actually
dampen the otherwise positive effects of risk-mitigating policy reforms.
Our criticism of zombie predictions should not be read as a general
criticism of prediction. Predictions are always based on historical data,
which, by definition, come from the past. But prediction at bail is
problematic because the training data often come from times and places
that are materially different from the ones where the predictions are
being made, and few actors continuously update tools with new facts.
138. Id. at 15.
139. We use the term “zombie” here, not in the Oxford English Dictionary’s first-listed sense of
“a soulless corpse said to have been revived by witchcraft,” but rather in the extended sense
indicated in the December 14, 2016 online update to the OED’s Third Edition—now listed as the
“most common sense” of the term—a “similar[ly] mindless creature.” OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY
ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/232982#eid13494009 (last visited Feb. 10,
2018). We choose this evocative term and its negative connotations intentionally.
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Responsible, fully informed prediction, where outcomes are tracked and
models refined and updated, is not susceptible to this objection.
1.

Today’s Predictions Follow Yesterday’s Patterns

Using one jurisdiction’s data to predict outcomes in another is an
inherently hazardous exercise, a challenge that is highlighted in the
existing literature. When a risk assessment tool’s developmental sample
does not reflect local conditions, it might not accurately classify risk.140
Geographic differences in law enforcement patterns, for example, can
undermine tools’ accuracy. The factors that bring individuals into
contact with the criminal justice system in one jurisdiction or country
may not be the same as those for offenders in a different jurisdiction or
country. Local differences in correctional resources can also make a
substantial difference in predictive efficacy. In writing about risk
assessment in the neighboring context of criminal sentencing, John
Monahan and Jennifer Skeem note that “[v]ariables that predict
recidivism in a jurisdiction with ample services for offenders may not
predict recidivism in a resource-poor jurisdiction.”141
Take the Level of Service (LS) family of assessment instruments as
an example. The LS tools are some of the most widely used risk and
needs assessment tools in correctional settings.142 Notably, the tools
were developed based on the histories of Canadian offenders.143 The
creators of those instruments found “high predictive validity” in their
published validation studies.144 But the “predictive performance results
reported by [other assessors] . . . , especially those outside Canada, have
not been as favorable.”145 One meta-analysis of LS-instruments found
that their predictive capacity was significantly worse for U.S. offenders,
compared to their performance for Canadian and other offenders.146

140. See, e.g., Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and Sexual Recidivism in
Sentencing Law, 47 ARIZ. ST. L. REV. 1, 33–39 (2015).
141. John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing, 12 ANN. REV.
CLINICAL PSYCHOL, 489, 500 (2016).
142. Grant Duwe & Michael Rocque, Effects of Automating Recidivism Risk Assessment on Reliability,
Predictive Validity, and Return on Investment (ROI), 16 CRIM. & PUB. POL’Y 235, 239 (2017).
143. Id. at 240 (“[These tools were] [d]eveloped on samples of Canadian offenders by the
creators of the RNR approach . . . .”).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 239.
146. See MARK E. OLVER ET AL., Thirty Years of Research on the Level of Service Scales: A
Metaanalytic Examination of Predictive Accuracy and Sources of Variability, 26 PSYCHOL.
ASSESSMENT. 156, 166 tbl.9 (2014).
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The same problem could easily apply not only across geography, but
also across time. Underlying conditions, like economic growth and
development, can change across time and lead to different results for
various reasons.147
Overall, problems arise when the group being assessed “is not similar
to the developmental sample, [or] the developmental sample is not a
representative reference for the individual to be assessed.”148 Just as a
pretrial resource-poor jurisdiction in Wyoming differs in significant
ways from a pretrial resource-rich jurisdiction in California, so too does
a single jurisdiction when it significantly changes its bail system. Simply
put, risk-mitigating policies will likely change the risks a defendant
faces upon release, just like a change in economic conditions or in time
can. Overall, using historic, pre-reform outcome data to predict future
risks within a jurisdiction that significantly reforms its bail system
deserves heightened, continued scrutiny.149
The challenge of time-based changes in risk applies equally to
jurisdictions that develop their own pretrial risk assessment tool from
scratch, and those that validate a tool developed elsewhere. For tools to
make well-calibrated predictions from the start, they need to be trained
on data that matches the conditions about which they are making
predictions.
There is strong reason to believe that the data used to build today’s
risk assessment tools do not match the reality into which the tools are
deployed. As we detailed in section II.C, jurisdictions across the country
are pursuing reforms aimed at transforming a defendant’s odds of
success upon release. But today’s risk assessment tools are not designed
to incorporate the effects of those reforms.
For example, consider the publicly available information about the
Public Safety Assessment (PSA) and Correctional Offender
147. For example, one can imagine that a jurisdiction that experiences substantial and equitable
economic growth might see rearrest and failure to appear rates decline, given a better overall
economic environment.
148. Hamilton, supra note 140, at 37.
149. In many ways, proposals for periodic, localized revalidation of risk assessment tools are
similar to our argument. For example, in the criminal sentencing context, Monahan and Skeem
argue that “[u]nless a tool is validated in a local system—and then periodically revalidated—there is
little assurance that it works.” Monahan & Skeem, supra note 141, at 500. These proposals capture
a sense that, within a jurisdiction, outcomes can change and that it is important for policymakers to
track those changes. Our argument effectively extends and further underscores this conceptual
point: thanks in part to the reforms that brought many risk assessment tools into existence, outcomes
within jurisdictions are already changing. The need for what Monahan and Skeem call for in the
sentencing context is heightened in the pretrial context, where the ground truth of rearrest and
failure to appear rates may be significantly mitigated by other pretrial policies.
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Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) were each
developed on multi-jurisdiction data. PSA, an instrument developed by
the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, is based on nearly 750,000 cases
drawn from more than 300 jurisdictions.150 Similarly, COMPAS was
initially developed on a sample of 30,000 survey responses,
administered to prison and jail inmates, probationers, and parolees
across the country, between January 2004 and November 2005.151 In all
likelihood, there will be some degree of a mismatch between
jurisdictions from which PSA and COMPAS drew their sample and
those jurisdictions in which the tools were deployed.
Pretrial risk assessment tools that are developed locally typically rely
upon smaller samples of data, often dating from before significant
reform efforts began. For example, the Florida Pretrial Risk Assessment
instrument was developed on 1,757 cases across six counties, from
January to March 2011.152 The Ohio Risk Assessment System’s Pretrial
Assessment Tool was developed on “over 1,800” cases, from September
2006 to October 2007.153 The Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment
Instrument was originally developed on a sample of 1,971 cases between
July 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999,154 though it was later revised based on
data from 2005.155
150. LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MODEL FOR PRETRIAL RISK
ASSESSMENT 3 (2013), https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAFresearch-summary_PSA-Court_4_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/945R-UWVD]. Notably, documents
recently released in response to public records requests note that the development data for the tool
came from state court systems in Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Maine, Ohio, and
Virginia, the District of Columbia, and the federal pretrial system. See ZACH DAL PRA, JUSTICE
SYS.
PARTNERS,
LJAF
PUBLIC
SAFETY
ASSESSMENT
PSA
27
(2016)
https://cdn.muckrock.com/foia_files/2016/12/15/Volusia_Stakeholder_Training_10162015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GZW5-3NA7].
151. NORTHPOINTE, INC., PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 11 (2015) (“The
Composite Norm Group consists of assessments from state prisons and parole agencies (33.8%);
jails
(13.6%);
and
probation
agencies
(52.6%).”),
http://www.northpointeinc.
com/downloads/compas/Practitioners-Guide-COMPAS-Core-_031915.pdf [https://perma.cc/RK2UCPAR]. Agencies using COMPAS Core can select the default norm group, or a more specific
subgroup, like “male jail” or “male prison/parole” or “female jail.” Id. at 11.
152. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., FLORIDA PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 3–4 (2012),
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey
=58add716-5e41-eba3-0a3d-f9298f7e1a54 [https://perma.cc/2HSS-LJAT].
153. Edward J. Latessa et al., The Creation and Validation of the Ohio Risk Assessment System
(ORAS), 74 FED. PROB. 21 (2010).
154. MARIE VANNOSTRAND, PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA 10 (2009),
https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/files/publications/corrections/virginia-pretrialrisk-assessment-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3ZH-G7UB].
155. MARIE VANNOSTRAND, VA. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., ASSESSING RISK AMONG
PRETRIAL DEFENDANTS IN VIRGINIA: THE VIRGINIA PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 4
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Even where bail reform legislation simultaneously introduces broad
pretrial reforms and risk assessment, the developers tasked with building
such a tool still have to look backwards for their examples.156 In fact, the
incentives to look further back in history can be strong. A larger, more
diverse dataset from which to draw a sample is less likely to contain
random statistical artifacts that could skew the results. But, in the bail
context, doing so will also mean a deeper reliance on data that represents
the historic risks of release, rather than the current ones.
Take Colorado as an example. A revised version of the Colorado
Pretrial Assessment Tool (CPAT) was released in October 2012.157 But
Colorado’s sweeping new bail reform was not signed into law until May
2013.158 Thus, in Colorado, we would expect to see zombie-style
predictions that overstate defendants’ true levels of risk.
The available data suggest that this may indeed have happened.
Below, we reproduce figures from The Colorado Bail Book: A Defense
Practitioner’s
Guide
To
Adult
Pretrial
Release.159

(2003), https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/files/publications/corrections/assessing
-risk-among-pretrial-defendants-virginia-virginia-pretrial-risk-assessment-instrument.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H47M-YAQV].
156. Notably, smaller jurisdictions (aside from likely having fewer resources to dedicate to
pretrial systems) might have fewer examples to create a locally-developed tool and thus have an
even greater incentive to look farther back.
157. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST. & JFA INST., supra note 133.
158. Act of May 11, 2013, ch. 202, 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 820.
159. COLO. CRIMINAL DEFENSE INST., COLO. STATE PUB. DEFENDER & NAT’L ASS’N OF
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS (NACDL), THE COLORADO BAIL BOOK: A DEFENSE
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO ADULT PRETRIAL RELEASE 51 app. 3 (2015).
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Table 2:
CPAT Risk Level Research Projections Compared to Denver
County Actuals160

CPAT
Projected
Denver
2012
Denver
2013
Denver
2014
Avg. Diff.

CPAT 1

CPAT 2

CPAT 3

CPAT 4

20%

49%

23%

8%

12%

39%

27%

22%

11%

38%

28%

23%

13%

39%

38%

20%

- 8%

- 10.33. . .%

+ 8%

+ 13.66. . .%

Here, the number of defendants who the tool’s designers expected to
be classified as CPAT 3 or CPAT 4—the higher risk categories—is
compared to the number of defendants who were actually classified as
CPAT 3 or CPAT 4. The gap is noticeable. Based on their training data,
the tool’s designers suggested that about a third of defendants would be
classified as higher risk. But, for each year of data in Denver, essentially
half of all defendants were assessed as higher risk. Based on the
available data, it’s unclear why this is the case.161
Simply classifying more defendants as high risk offers little insight.
The other side of the coin is, how did defendants who were classified as
higher
risk
perform?

160. Id.
161. One might suspect that defendants from Denver are higher risk than other Coloradans and
were not included, or were not heavily weighted, in the development sample of CPAT. In fact,
defendants from Denver actually represented 13% of CPAT’s development sample. PRETRIAL
JUSTICE INST. & JFA INST., supra note 133, at 9.
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Table 3:
Failure to Appear Rates Across CPAT Risk Category in Denver162

CPAT
Projected
2013
Denver
Actual
2014
Denver
Actual
Avg. Diff

CPAT 1

CPAT 2

CPAT 3

CPAT 4

5%

15%

23%

49%

7%

11%

16%

20%

5%

14%

16%

23%

+ 1%

- 2.5%

- 7%

- 27.5%

Table 4:
Failure to Appear Rates Across CPAT Risk Category in Mesa163

CPAT
Projected
2014 Mesa
Actual
Avg. Diff

162. Id.
163. Id.

CPAT 1
5%

CPAT 2
15%

CPAT 3
23%

CPAT 4
49%

7%

9%

13%

15%

+ 2%

- 6%

- 10%

- 34%
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Figure 2:
(Drawn from Tables 3 and 4)

Table 5:
New Criminal Offense Rates Across CPAT Category in Denver164

CPAT
Projected
2013
Denver
Actual
2014
Denver
Actual
Avg. Diff

164. Id.

CPAT 1

CPAT 2

CPAT 3

CPAT 4

9%

20%

31%

42%

3%

8%

15%

18%

4%

7%

14%

20%

- 5.5%

- 12.5%

- 16.5%

- 23%
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Table 6:
New Criminal Offense Rates Across CPAT Category in Mesa165
CPAT 1
CPAT
9%
Projected
2014 Mesa
11%
Actual
Avg. Diff
+ 2%

CPAT 2

CPAT 3

CPAT 4

20%

31%

42%

21%

25%

28%

+ 1%

- 6%

- 14%

Figure 3:
(Drawn from Tables 5 and 6)

We find similar evidence in efforts to develop and validate the Public
Safety Assessment.166 The rate of failures to appear in the PSA’s
developmental sample167 diverged from the rate of failures to appear in

165. Id.
166. DAL PRA, supra note 150, at 31–32, 46–47.
167. The developmental sample for PSA came from jurisdictions in Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Kentucky, Ohio, Maine, Virginia, Washington D.C. and the Federal Pretrial Services. See
LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA USED TO DEVELOP THE PUBLIC SAFETY
ASSESSMENT, http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/Criminal-Justice-Data-Used-toDevelop-the-Public-Safety-Assessment-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3ZE-YRZ5].
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jurisdictions where PSA was subsequently validated.168 As Table 6
demonstrates for the top four risk grades—that is defendants receiving
FTA scores of 3, 4, 5, and 6—defendants on whom the PSA was
actually used (that is, those in the validation sample) succeeded more
often than their counterparts in the developmental sample. We see less of
this phenomenon with respect to “new criminal activity” rates in
Table 7. Nevertheless, it appears that defendants who are assessed as
higher risk, in reality, present a lower risk than expected upon release.
Table 7:
Failure to Appear Rates Across PSA FTA Categories169
FTA 1
PSA
Developmental 10%
Sample
PSA
12%
Validation
Avg. Diff.
+ 2%

FTA 2

FTA 3

FTA 4

FTA 5

FTA 6

15%

20%

31%

35%

40%

16%

18%

23%

27%

30%

+ 1%

- 2%

- 8%

- 8%

- 10%

Table 8:
New Criminal Activity Rates Across PSA NCA Categories170
NCA
1
PSA
Developmental 10%
Sample
PSA
9%
Validation
Avg. Diff.
- 2%

NCA
2

NCA
3

NCA
4

NCA
5

NCA
6

15%

23%

30%

48%

55%

15%

21%

34%

43%

52%

+ 0%

- 2%

+ 4%

- 5%

- 3%

This is the stark, unfortunate irony at the heart of today’s bail reform:
today’s pretrial risk assessment tools reflect and reinforce the very
patterns of failure to appear that new, innovative policies work to

168. DAL PRA, supra note 150, at 31, 46.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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change. Below, we consider specifically how these other policy changes
may be shaping changes in failure to appear and rearrest risk.
2.

Expanded Pretrial Services Will Change the True Risk of Failure
to Appear

Small changes in the administration of bail can have a substantial
impact on failure to appear rates in a jurisdiction. Many of these reforms
are relatively low-cost and low-tech, such as text message reminders
about upcoming court dates. Creating pretrial service agencies in
jurisdictions that do not already have them, and expanding funding for
those agencies already in place, will likely further curb the incidence of
failures to appear.171 Of course, a given intervention may reduce failure
to appear more in one population than another. For example, low-income
defendants, who may lack stable housing, might disproportionately
benefit from text message reminders, as opposed to physical postcards
sent by mail.
“Failure to appear” often reflects factors far more prosaic than a
defendant absconding from the jurisdiction. As a 2001 National Institute
of Justice report noted, when “released defendants miss a court
appearance, it is often not because they are fleeing from prosecution but,
rather, for other reasons ranging from genuine lack of knowledge about
the scheduled date to forgetfulness.”172
What causes such non-flight failures to appear? Considering the
available data for similarly charged defendants who are unable to meet
financial conditions of release, it is likely that financial needs play a
prominent role for those who do obtain release. People with jobs that
have inflexible hours, or that require a significant commute, might find it
difficult or impractical to miss work for a court date. A defendant might
also fail to appear because they simply forget about an upcoming court
appearance. They may be afraid or have insufficient information about
how to get to court, what to do once there, and what will happen next.
Some observers emphasize the slow pace of justice, arguing that “the
typically long period of time between the citation and the court date
171. See, e.g., MARIE VANNOSTRAND, KENNETH J. ROSE & KIMBERLY WEIBRECHT, PRETRIAL
JUSTICE INST., STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF PRETRIAL RELEASE RECOMMENDATIONS AND
SUPERVISION (2011); NAT’L ASSOC. OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, STANDARDS ON PRETRIAL
RELEASE 15 (3d ed. 2004) (“Pretrial programs are a vitally important part of [a criminal justice
system] because they perform functions that, in their absence, are often performed inadequately or
not at all.”).
172. BARRY MAHONEY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL
SERVICES PROGRAMS: RESPONSIBILITIES AND POTENTIAL 38 (2001).
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naturally leads to [failures to appear] due to the relative instability of
many defendants.”173 One study found that the amount of time between a
defendant’s release and the disposition of her case was the most
important factor in predicting failures to appear.174 Others argue that
defendants are often “unaware that failing to show up for court can lead
to an arrest warrant for seemingly minor violations of the law.”175 Still
others counter that deliberate refusals to appear in court are
commonplace. These are the risks that reforms are motivated to
mitigate.176
A series of studies suggests that reminders, alone, may make a major
difference. For example, administrators in Jefferson County, Colorado
implemented live-caller reminders where, if the caller “successfully
contacted a defendant, she read a script (in either English or Spanish)
reminding the defendant of the court date, giving directions to the court,
and warning the defendant of the consequences of failing to appear for
court.”177 The results of the program were described as “exceptional.”178
In 2010, “the court-appearance rate for defendants who were
successfully contacted was 91%, compared to an appearance rate of 71%
for those who were not.”179
A study in fourteen counties across Nebraska found that postcard
reminders significantly reduced failure to appear rates.180 The study
examined three different types of postcard reminders (all in
English/Spanish): one reminder-only postcard with just a notification,
173. Timothy R. Schnacke, Michael R. Jones & Dorian M. Wilderman, Increasing CourtAppearance Rates and Other Benefits of Live-Caller Telephone Court-Date Reminders: The
Jefferson County, Colorado, FTA Pilot Project and Resulting Court Date Notification Program, 48
CT. REV. 86, 87 (2012).
174. STEVENS H. CLARKE, JEAN L. FREEMAN & GARY KOCH, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BAIL
SYSTEMS: AN ANALYSIS OF FAILURE TO APPEAR IN COURT AND REARREST WHILE ON BAIL 34
(1976).
175. Schnacke, Jones & Wilderman, supra note 173, at 87.
176. PRETRIAL JUSTICE CTR. FOR COURTS, USE OF COURT DATE REMINDER NOTICES TO
IMPROVE COURT APPEARANCE RATES 1 (2017) (“Several jurisdictions across the country have
adopted a court date reminder process (or court date notification system) to improve court
appearance rates, such as in Coconino County (AZ), Jefferson County (CO), Lafayette Parish (LA),
Reno (NV), New York City (NY), Multnomah and Yamhill Counties (OR), Philadelphia (PA), King
County (WA), and the states of Arizona, Kentucky, and Nebraska. Recently, Judge Timothy C.
Evans, Chief Judge of the Cook County Circuit Court in Illinois, issued an order requiring the
county to implement a pretrial notification system by December 1, 2017.”).
177. Schnacke, Jones & Wilderman, supra note 173, at 91.
178. Id. at 92.
179. Id.
180. Alan Tomkins et al, An Experiment in the Law: Studying a Technique to Reduce Failure to
Appear in Court, 48 CT. REV. 96, 100 (2012).
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one reminder postcard that included the threat of sanctions for failure to
appear, and one that included both the threat of sanctions and other
elements of procedural justice.181 All led to significant reduction in
failures to appear.182
Other initiatives look to capitalize on SMS text messages as a
reminder. For example, the Court Messaging Project—an open-source
initiative from Stanford’s Legal Design Lab—works to “to make the
court system more navigable and to improve people’s sense of
procedural justice—that the legal system is fair, comprehensible, and
user-friendly.”183 In New York City, a recent experiment found that
simple text reminders reduced failures to appear by 21%, while those
with more information led to a 26% drop.184 Uptrust, a company “which
sends text message reminders to attend court and other obligations”
claims it can reduce failure to appear rates by 75%.185
Other reforms might reduce a defendant’s flight risk, too. For
example, electronic monitoring—a contentious, highly invasive
condition of release—already has a long history of pretrial use, and may
deter defendants from fleeing.186 But unlike reminders—whose
effectiveness is documented in a wide range of studies—the efficacy of
GPS monitoring for reducing flight from the jurisdiction remains an
open question.187 But it is certainly plausible to imagine that electronic
monitoring would effectively deter some accused people who might flee
from actually fleeing. If so, such an intervention would further reduce
the risk of pretrial failure, compared with historical outcomes.188
But consider New York City. At a recent public event, the City’s
Criminal Justice Agency announced that it would be developing a new

181. Id.
182. Id. at 98–100.
183. The
Court
Messaging
Project,
STAN.
LEGAL
DESIGN
LAB,
http://www.legaltechdesign.com/CourtMessagingProject/ [https://perma.cc/GJ82-K3QQ].
184. BRICE COOKE ET AL., USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
OUTCOMES:
PREVENTING
FAILURES
TO
APPEAR
IN
COURT
16
(2018),
https://urbanlabs.uchicago.edu/attachments/store/9c86b123e3b00a5da58318f438a6e787dd01d66d0e
fad54d66aa232a6473/I42-954_NYCSummonsPaper_Final_Mar2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRG8RBZ8].
185. What We Do - Our Results, UPTRUST, http://www.uptrust.co/what-we-do#our-results-section
[https://perma.cc/GJ82-K3QQ].
186. Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE. L.J.
1344, 1365 (2014).
187. Id. at 1368–69. Most focus on post-conviction proceedings, though a few studies have
examined the effectiveness at pretrial (albeit with small sample sizes).
188. Though, as we noted, the incidence of flight from a jurisdiction in 2017 is probably minimal.
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risk assessment tool, based on seven years of criminal justice data.189
According to the announcement, source data for the new model would
come from 2009–2015.190 But the City’s arrest practices during that
period have been held unconstitutional,191 and therefore are not and
should not be a reliable guide, legally or statistically, to who will be
arrested in the future. That is particularly true for the very groups of
people, like young men of color, who were disproportionately stopped,
questioned, and frisked during this period of time.192
Complicating matters even further, the City only recently began an
expansive supervised release program in March 2016.193 Earlier release
programs were only pilot programs in select areas. Thus, as it is
currently envisioned, New York City’s new risk assessment tool will
base its predictions primarily on the outcomes of unsupervised release,
even though it is being deployed in a setting where more releases can be
supervised. As a result, more defendants might be classified as a high
risk of failure to appear simply because the new model does not reflect
their greater likelihood of reappearance thanks to supervision. At the
margin, this would likely lead some defendants who could succeed on
release (indeed, some of the very ones who could be most helped by the
new program) to be jailed instead. In addition, the City recently began
sending text message reminders to all accused people for whom it has a
mobile number, building on a successful trial deployment.194
Of course, New York City is just a microcosm. Today’s suite of
pretrial risk assessment tools were largely “trained” on populations that
did not receive the benefit of newly-enacted, risk-mitigating reforms.195
189. Dr. Richard Peterson, Research Director, N.Y.C. Criminal Justice Agency, Address at
Measuring Justice: Redesigning New York City’s Pretrial Risk Assessment and Recommendation
System (Sept. 18, 2017).
190. Id.; N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 2016, at 2 (2018),
https://www.nycja.org/measuring-justice-panel/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2018).
191. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 540, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
192. See Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.nyclu.org/en/stop-andfrisk-data [https://perma.cc/B94T-2KR2] (observing that in 2009–2015 blacks and Latinos
represented more than 80% of stops).
193. CINDY REDCROSS, MELANIE SKEMER, DANNIA GUZMAN, INSHA RAHMAN & JESSI
LACHANCE, NEW YORK CITY’S PRETRIAL SUPERVISED RELEASE PROGRAM: AN ALTERNATIVE TO
BAIL 4 (2017), https://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/SupervisedRelease%20Brief%202017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2GQ3-XRWV].
194. See New Text Message Reminders for Summons Recipients Improves Attendance in Court
and Dramatically Cuts Warrants, N.Y.C., http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/05818/new-text-message-reminders-summons-recipients-improves-attendance-court-dramatically
[https://perma.cc/4GCZ-8VT6].
195. Despite studies and pilot projects demonstrating the success of live-caller reminders,
postcard reminders, and other reminders in helping reduce the number of failures to appear, the
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As a result, the question that today’s tools answer is, “how likely is this
defendant to return to court on schedule without being reminded to
appear?” The tools do not measure, because the historical data does not
and cannot reflect, the greater chance that some defendants will reappear
after being reminded.
3.

Replacing or Cabining Money Bail Could Reduce the True Risk of
Rearrest for Those Released

Transformative bail reforms that reduce or altogether eliminate
money bail—if they lead, as expected, to many more releases on
recognizance—are likely to reduce the risk of pretrial rearrest. As
detailed above,196 research demonstrates that pretrial detention itself
actually increases risk of pretrial rearrest once a defendant is released.
And current statistics clearly show that money bail is the main reason
defendants spend any significant amount of time in jail pretrial.197
Accordingly, policies that would reduce or eliminate money bail, and
release those who would otherwise be held on small bail amounts, are
likely to have a significant effect. Such policies would likely reduce the
number of people who spend any time in jail pretrial. As a result,
released defendants will likely face a lower risk of rearrest following
their immediate release from custody. In short, by reducing the incidence
of pretrial detention, jurisdictions may also reduce the overall level of
rearrest risk.
Recent research lends support to this hypothesis.198 Professors Paul
Heaton, Sandra Mayson, and Megan Stevenson, find that if defendants
in Harris County, Texas who were assigned the lowest amount of cash
bail ($500) had simply been released instead, the county would have
released 40,000 more defendants pretrial between 2008 and 2013.199
They further find that if those defendants had been directly released (and
majority of pretrial service agencies have not adopted these relatively low-tech techniques. For
example, the findings from a 2009 Pretrial Justice Institute survey for pretrial service programs
found that from 1989 to 2009, the percentage of programs that called the defendant before a
scheduled court date declined from over 40% in 1989 to 30% in 2009. In 2009, about 5% of
programs used an automated dialing system to call and remind the defendant. The percentage of
programs that produced a manually generated reminder letter in 1989 was just under 40%, but in
2009 was about 4%, while about 17% used automatically generated reminder letters. Almost 10% of
surveyed pretrial service agencies had no court date reminder procedures at all. See PRETRIAL
JUSTICE INST., 2009 SURVEY OF PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS 50 (2009).
196. See supra section III.B.3.
197. See Heaton, Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 94.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 787.
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did not spend any time in jail at all between arraignment and trial), these
defendants as a group would have committed 1,600 fewer felonies and
2,400 fewer misdemeanors than they ultimately did after their eventual,
later releases.200 They find that pretrial detention increases the share of
defendants charged with new misdemeanors by more than 13% thirty
days post-bail hearing, and increases the share of defendants charged
with new felonies by more than 30% within one-year post-bail
hearing.201
If Harris County abandoned their bail schedule in favor of a
presumption of release on personal recognizance, the effect could be
significant.202 The incidence of pretrial detention would likely
significantly decline. Such a policy would, in turn, accomplish what
Heaton, Mayson, and Stevenson simulate: reduce the number of pretrial
rearrests, and of rearrests post-case disposition.
Yet, a risk assessment tool developed on data that predates these
reforms would not capture this new ground truth. Such a risk assessment
tool would, oddly, compare post-reform defendants, who benefitted from
being released immediately, to a very different group: defendants who
were detained a few days or several weeks before being able to meet
their financial conditions of release.
Here, the risk assessment tool would be blind to the range of possible
risk-mitigating reforms and would instead look back to pre-reform
outcomes to characterize the defendant’s risk. Doing so will, in all
likelihood, overstate those defendants’ risk of rearrest.203 And in
jurisdictions where a higher risk assessment score for rearrest can lead to

200. Id.
201. Id. at 768 tbl.8.
202. Judge Lee H. Rosenthal’s April 28 injunction on Harris County’s bail system effectively
forces this to occur. Her order required the sheriff’s office to release those charged with
misdemeanors within twenty-four hours of their arrest, unless they are wanted on a detainer from
other jurisdictions, on immigration proceedings, on mental health concerns, or are held family
violence protection measures. Since early June, more than 2,600 defendants have been released on
personal bond. See Gabrielle Banks & Mihir Zaveri, Harris County’s Bail Battle to Resume Before
Fifth
U.S.
Circuit
in
October,
CHRON
(Aug.
1,
2017,
12:55
PM),
https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Harris-County-s-historic-bail-battle-to-resume11723175.php [https://perma.cc/26RR-ZB8Z].
203. As detailed above, if defendants assigned the lowest bail amounts had been directly released
(and did not spend any time in jail at all between arraignment and trial), these defendants as a group
would have committed 1,600 fewer felonies and 2,400 fewer misdemeanors than they ultimately did
after their eventual, later releases. Now, imagine two different risk assessment tools: one built on
pre-reform data, and one built on post-reform data. In all likelihood, the post-reform risk assessment
would observe significantly fewer pretrial rearrests, indicating a diminished risk of pretrial release.
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presumptive pretrial detention hearing, like New Jersey,204 it is possible
that some poor defendants will be jailed because, historically, the jailing
of people similarly situated left those people incredibly ill-prepared to
succeed on release.
4.

Zombie Predictions May Dampen the Positive Effects of Other
Reforms

Zombie predictions might perversely undermine the apparent impact
of other bail reforms. A robust literature on the communication and
framing of risk suggests that judges will perceive “risky” defendants as
tainted, and will treat them differently.205 Thus, zombie predictions may
steer a sizable number of defendants away from risk-mitigating reforms
and, in turn, dampen the positive effects of policy reforms. In turn, such
systematic over-prediction of risk may make the ground realities in a
jurisdiction seem worse than they truly are. That is, policymakers may
see that there are more “risky” defendants in their jurisdiction than they
might have expected. Accordingly, policymakers might second-guess
their pursuit of risk-mitigating reforms and focus on more punitive,
restrictive conditions of release. This potential feedback loop is subtle,
and may be hard to detect, but it should nevertheless concern
reformers—if they cannot champion the positive results of new policies
and procedures, their endeavor may backfire.
204. Previously, Rule 3:4A(b)(5) indicated that “The court may consider as prima facie evidence
sufficient to overcome the presumption of release a recommendation by the Pretrial Services
Program established pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162–25 that the defendant’s release is not
recommended (i.e., a determination that “release not recommended or if released, maximum
conditions” (emphasis omitted)). State v. Mercedes, 183 A.3d 914, 922–23 (N.J. 2018). In State v.
Mercedes, the state supreme court revised the rule to read as follows: “The standard of proof for the
rebuttal of the presumption of pretrial release shall be by clear and convincing evidence. To
determine whether a motion for pretrial detention should be granted, the court may take into account
information about the factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2A:162–20.” Id. at 926. As Justice Albin noted in his
concurrence, “[t]he pretrial services recommendation, through the court rule, could have operated to
undermine the rebuttable presumption favoring pretrial release.” Id. at 931 (Albin, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
205. See, e.g., MORRIS E. CHAFETZ, THE TYRANNY OF EXPERTS: BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON THE
CULT OF EXPERTISE 103 (1996); Leam A. Craig & Anthony Beech, Best Practice in Conducting
Actuarial Risk Assessments with Adult Sexual Offenders, 15 J. SEXUAL AGGRESSION 193, 197
(2009); Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the
Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 906 (2003); Nicholas Scurich et al.,
Innumeracy and Unpacking: Bridging the Nomothetic/Idiographic Divide in Violence Risk
Assessment, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 548, 548 (2012); Nicholas Scurich & Richard S. John, The
Effect of Framing Actuarial Risk Probabilities on Involuntary Civil Commitment Decisions, 35 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 83 (2011); Paul Slovic et al., Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Communication:
The Effects of Using Actual Cases, Providing Instruction, and Employing Probability Versus
Frequency Formats, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 271 (2000).

08 - Koepke & Robinson (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

12/28/2018 4:27 PM

1772

[Vol. 93:1725

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

Once risk is overestimated, defendants may be subject to stricter
conditions of release through the decision-making framework.206 This
observation is especially relevant given the literature on how lower-risk
defendants perform with certain release conditions.207 Studies have
shown that lower-risk defendants succeed on release (meaning fewer
failures to appear, and fewer rearrests upon release) more often when
released without conditions, and that placing conditions of release on
lower-risk defendants can actually worsen their odds of success.208
Such a scenario—where defendants are systematically overestimated
as riskier than they truly are, leading lower-risk defendants to be
subjected to conditions of release that are counterproductive—could
perversely sustain an avoidably elevated pretrial failure rate. Similarly, a
systematic overestimation of rearrest risk may lead jurisdictions to
unduly lean on more controversial, restrictive reforms, such as electronic
monitoring.
Consider a hypothetical defendant. She was assessed by a pretrial risk
assessment tool that was developed on historical data that predates her
county’s bail reform. The tool forecast her to be a moderate failure to
appear risk and rearrest risk. Accordingly, the jurisdiction’s decisionmaking framework called for her to be subject to monthly in-person
reporting to pretrial services, monthly phone check-ins, as well as a
curfew. In reality, she was a busy single mother, who simply needed a
timely phone reminder to ensure her appearance. If she had been
assessed as a lower failure to appear risk, that’s the only intervention she
would have received. However, the zombie prediction led her to then be
subject counterproductive conditions of release. As a single mother, the
in-person check-ins and curfew were difficult to manage. Ultimately, she
failed to appear for some of her court dates, but appeared to most. This
hypothetical is of course stylized. But the risks are plausible given the
implementation of today’s bail reforms.

206. Decision-making frameworks are discussed more in the next section.
207. See generally CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP & MARIE VANNOSTRAND, EXPLORING THE
IMPACT OF SUPERVISION ON PRETRIAL OUTCOMES (2013) (finding that “the differences between
those who received pretrial supervision and those who did not was most pronounced for higher-risk
defendants”); Marie VanNostrand & Gena Keebler, Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court,
FED. PROBATION, Sept. 2009, at 30, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fed_probation
_sept_2009_test_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/63ZB-4B6Y] (“Paradoxically, when required of lower-risk
defendants, i.e., risk levels 1 and 2, release conditions that included alternatives to detention were
more likely to result in pretrial failure. These defendants were, in effect, over-supervised given their
risk level.”).
208. See LOWENKAMP & VANNOSTRAND, supra note 207; VanNostrand & Keebler, supra note 207.
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As an example, consider New Jersey. Below is a comparison of the
percentage of defendants that the state expected would be subject to each
set of conditions of release—what New Jersey calls pretrial monitoring
levels (PML)209—versus the actual percentages of defendants who were
subject to each level.210
Table 9:
New Jersey’s Projected Conditions of Release vs. Actuals
1/1/17-12/31/17211

ROR
PML 1
PML 2
PML 3
PML 3 +
Detention

DMF
recommended
%s
26.9
24.6
16.3
9.8
2.4
5.1

Actual State
Avg. %s
1/1/17-12/31/17
7.5
20.6
14.8
26.4
8.3
18.1

Net difference

- 19.4
- 4.0
- 1.5
+ 16.6
+ 5.9
+ 13.00

209. ACLU OF N.J., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS & STATE OF N.J. OFFICE OF THE
PUB. DEF., THE NEW JERSEY PRETRIAL JUSTICE MANUAL 11 (2016) [hereinafter N.J. PRETRIAL
JUSTICE MANUAL], https://www.nacdl.org/NJPretrial/ [https://perma.cc/R6V3-5BSG].
210. Chart A: Initial Release Decisions for Criminal Justice Reform Eligible Defendants January
1
–
December
31,
2017,
N.J.
COURTS,
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/assets/criminal/cjrreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3PWVGVTY]; see also Chart A: Initial Release Decisions for Criminal Justice Reform Eligible
Defendants
January
1,
2018
–
September
30,
2018,
N.J.
COURTS,
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/cjrreport2018.pdf?cacheID=R6PoVYo
[https://perma.cc/M69V-RZDG].
211. Chart A: Initial Release Decisions for Criminal Justice Reform Eligible Defendants January
1 – December 31, 2017, supra note 210.
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Figure 4:
(Taken from Data in Table 9)

Table 10:
New Jersey’s Projected Conditions of Release vs. Actuals
1/1/18-9/30/18212

ROR
PML 1
PML 2
PML 3
PML 3 +
Detention

DMF
recommended
%s
26.9
24.6
16.3
9.8
2.4
5.1

Actual State
Avg. %s
1/1/18-9/30/18
8.8
17.2
17.3
27.2
5.7
19.2

Net difference

- 18.1
- 7.4
+ 1.0
+ 17.4
+ 3.3
+ 14.1

Here, about one-third more defendants were subject to the most
restrictive conditions of release, or were denied release, than the state
anticipated. And while the state expected nearly a quarter of defendants
to be released on recognizance, only 7.5–8.8% of defendants were.
Meanwhile, while only 10% of defendants were supposed to be subject
to the relatively intense monitoring known as PML 3, in fact more than a

212. Chart A: Initial Release Decisions for Criminal Justice Reform Eligible Defendants January
1, 2018 – September 30, 2018, supra note 210.
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quarter were. The projected and actual intensities of pretrial supervision
are nearly perfectly reversed.
Based on available data, it is difficult to explain these gaps.213 One
potential explanation is that more defendants than expected were
charged with crimes that carry a presumptive recommendation detention
or high-levels of supervision. Another possibility is that defendants have
systematically been overestimated as risky, and thus subject to more
punitive and restrictive conditions of release. Similarly, it could be that
defendants’ risk was assessed as lower, but judges systematically
increased conditions of release. Of course, all the above could be true.
But, under this Article’s argument, when defendants are
systematically overestimated as riskier than they truly are (and thus
subject to conditions of release that are potentially counterproductive),
jurisdictions could, perversely, sustain an avoidably elevated pretrial
failure rate.214 As a result, policymakers in the future might look back on
the move toward non-financial conditions of release as misguided and
might inaccurately conclude that, despite its ills, a money bail system is
the least bad option.
Here, the history of bail reform is instructive: conservatives in the late
1960s used the logic of liberal reforms to, in turn, advocate for a
broader, more punitive system. Similarly, though pretrial risk assessment
tools currently enjoy bipartisan support in the mission of decarceration,
pretrial risk assessment tools and decision-making frameworks are
vulnerable to a new “law and order” turn. In fact, New Jersey’s Attorney
General just recently released modified guidance related to its decisionmaking framework, adjusting many recommendations to favor lower
standards for pretrial detention.215

213. To our knowledge, New Jersey has not released data on failure to appear or rearrest rates for
2017. Nor has New Jersey released data on how many defendants received what kind of PSA
classification. Thus, we cannot compare risk forecast, against conditions of release, against pretrial
failure rates. As a result, we cannot clearly evaluate whether or not defendants were systematically
overestimated as riskier than they truly were. Nor can we see the effects these conditions of release
have.
214. We do not suggest that in every case this would be true. Of course, local conditions vary
considerably. Some jurisdictions might have put a premium on releasing a majority of defendants on
their own recognizance, or with the minimal set of conditions. Others might experience a decline in
cases where certain charges require certain more restrictive conditions of release.
215. For example, many modifications “recalibrate[d] the presumptions for pretrial-detention
applications that are triggered by the PSA scores” downward. See Memorandum from Christopher
S. Porrino, N.J. Att’y Gen. to Director, Div. of Criminal Justice et al. (May 24, 2017),
http://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases17/Revised-AG-Directive-2016-6_Introductory-Memo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/722W-TVX2].

08 - Koepke & Robinson (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

12/28/2018 4:27 PM

1776

[Vol. 93:1725

C.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Frameworks of Moral Judgment

Between any statistical estimate of risk and the deciding judge, there
is an important mediating layer—a series of choices about what the risk
estimates mean, how much risk is tolerable, how to manage that risk,
and how to communicate that information to a judge. Though there is
growing public debate about the quantitative interstices of risk
assessment, there is relatively little discussion of the vital policy
judgments that render those risk numbers into actionable advice.216
These policy judgments are often represented in matrices, somewhat
interchangeably referred to as a “structured decision-making process,”
“pretrial decision-making matrix,” “decision making framework,”
“praxis,” or, most recently, a “release conditions matrix.”217 These

216. See, e.g., Sam Corbett-Davies, Emma Pierson, Avi Feller & Sharad Goel, A Computer
Program Used for Bail and Sentencing Decisions was Labeled Biased Against Blacks. It’s Actually
Not That Clear, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2016/10/17/can-an-algorithm-be-racist-our-analysis-is-more-cautious-thanpropublicas/?utm_term=.33e6169658ac [https://perma.cc/8Q3U-25HS]; Sam Corbett-Davies,
Sharad Goel & Sandra González-Bailón, Even Imperfect Algorithms Can Improve the Criminal
Justice
System,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
20,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/upshot/algorithms-bail-criminal-justice-system.html
(last
visited Nov. 11, 2018); Issie Lapowsky, One State’s Bail Reform Exposes the Promise and Pitfalls
of Tech-Driven Justice, WIRED (Sept. 5, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/bail-reformtech-justice/ [https://perma.cc/G9YK-7JUZ]; Adam Liptak, Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s
Secret
Algorithms,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
1,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-software-programs-secretalgorithms.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2018); Megan Stevenson, Opinion, In US Bail Reform,
Justice-By-Algorithm Can Only Go So Far, HILL (Feb. 2, 2018, 8:15 AM),
https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/371954-in-us-bail-reform-justice-by-algorithm-can-only-goso-far [https://perma.cc/6V3U-GW64]; Elizabeth Glazer, Hannah Jane Sassaman & Jon Wool,
Debating Risk-Assessment Tools: Experts Weigh in on Whether Algorithms Have a Place in our
Criminal Justice System, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 25, 2017, 2:29 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/10/25/debating-risk-assessment-tools
[https://perma.cc/43MU-XA7R]; Logan Koepke, A Reality Check: Algorithms in Courtroom,
MEDIUM (Dec. 21 2017), https://medium.com/equal-future/a-reality-check-algorithms-in-thecourtroom-7c972da182c5 [https://perma.cc/S3ZR-TN6X]; Jon Schuppe, Post Bail, NBC NEWS
(Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/specials/bail-reform [https://perma.cc/VPE4-SYFZ].
217. See generally MONA DANNER, MARIE VANNOSTRAND & LISA SPRUANCE, RACE AND
GENDER NEUTRAL PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT, RELEASE RECOMMENDATIONS, AND
SUPERVISION:
VPRAI
AND
PRAXIS
REVISED
(2016),
https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/files/publications/corrections/race-and-genderneutral-pretrial-risk-assessment-release-recommendations-and-supervision.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LER3-HTB2]; N.J. COURTS, PRETRIAL RELEASE RECOMMENDATION DECISION
MAKING
FRAMEWORK
(DMF)
(2018),
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/decmakframwork.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L598Y5W3]; LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT IMPLEMENTATION
GUIDES: 9. GUIDE TO THE RELEASE CONDITIONS MATRIX (2018) [hereinafter GUIDE TO THE
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matrices attach risk assessment scores to a proposed course of action for
a judge or pretrial service agency. The frameworks are similar to bail
schedules. But, where charged offenses might have previously
determined outcomes in bail schedules, risk assessment scores guide
conditions of release (or non-release) in decision-making frameworks.
Below is a visual summary of the decision-making framework used in
New Jersey.218
Figure 5:
New Jersey’s Decision-making Framework219

In the above example, a defendant who receives a new criminal arrest
score of four (“NCA 4”) and a failure to appear score of three (“FTA 3”)
would be suggested for what New Jersey calls “pretrial monitoring
level 2” (“PML 2”). Each pretrial monitoring level calls for different
non-financial conditions of release, with each increase in pretrial
monitoring level calling for a requisite increase in the number or kind of
conditions. For example, PML 2 includes various conditions for a

RELEASE
CONDITIONS
MATRIX],
https://psapretrial.org/implementation/guides/managingrisk/guide-to-the-release-conditions-matrix (last visited Nov. 6, 2018).
218. N.J. COURTS, supra note 217, at 4.
219. Id.
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pretrial defendant like reporting once a month in person, once a month
by phone, and abide by some set of other restrictions, like a curfew.220
In addition to the moral and political question of how to respond to
risk, there are essential factual questions at the core of risk assessment
implementation that today’s instruments make no attempt to answer.
These questions concern responsiveness: how will various defendants
respond to particular pretrial services and conditions? Pretrial risk
assessment instruments do not speak to which conditions will work best,
or will prove harmful, for which defendants.
In short, it is vitally important to understand that the specific contents
of these grids are not supplied by statistical evidence. For all the public
discussion of validation and evidence-based practice, implementing a
risk assessment still requires someone to use clinical judgment to
estimate, non-statistically, which defendants would be helped or harmed
by which conditions.
To be sure, some numbers do exist that bear on this question—for
example, as discussed above, studies have found that imposing
burdensome conditions can actually increase the risks posed by low risk
defendants. But when a jurisdiction applies such findings or assesses
local numbers to create its own grid, it inevitably must run such numbers
through a filter of human judgment. Even in the most evidence-based of
jurisdictions, the decision-making framework necessarily reflects expert
opinion about which conditions tend to work well for whom. And such
opinions, while a vital resource, should not be regarded as scientific
findings.
1.

Undemocratic Justice

Determining how much risk a society should tolerate, and then
formalizing those answers inside decision-making frameworks, is a
difficult political and moral question, not a primarily technical one. To
date, however, this decision has generally not been a target of considered
political or policy debate.

220. Id. at 10. Note that, in some jurisdictions, some charges or circumstances may predetermine
an outcome where pretrial detention will be ordered regardless of the risk assessment result.
Typically, these charges might include murder, rape, first degree robbery, felony domestic violence,
violation of a protective order, felony sex crimes, or charges involving the use of a weapon. Another
example of a DMF matrix can be seen in Volusia County, Florida. There, the release with
conditions level 1 requires monthly reporting, release with conditions level 2 requires bi-weekly
reporting, and release with conditions level 3 requires weekly in-person meeting. See DAL PRA,
supra note 150, at 50.
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The description of a defendant or group of defendants as “high risk,”
for example, singles that group out for different treatment, and there is
no mathematical rule about how expansive the category should be, or
what it should or does mean.221
To see the quandary, it may be helpful to imagine defendants lined up
in descending order of their respective risk levels as calculated by a
statistical model. The most widely used metric for the performance of a
risk assessment instrument is the “Area Under the Curve” (AUC) metric,
which simply measures the likelihood that when two individuals are
picked at random, the one with the higher score actually does have a
higher true level of risk.222 In other words, the AUC measures the extent
to which a risk tool places different defendants into correct rank order of
riskiness for whatever the tool measures. The AUC does not, however,
say anything about the size of the difference in risk level between any
two individuals, or between any two deciles in the risk distribution.
The question of how to define and use risk categories, in short, may
best be answered by tandem consideration of three things—a
community’s preferences and moral judgments; the specifics of how
“risk” has been defined and measured; and a histogram that literally
displays the shape of how that risk is distributed in the population of
defendants.
To date, few if any jurisdictions have successfully combined these
elements. Instead, risk categories are defined by technicians and
interpreted (or at times misinterpreted) by judges. One advocate who
works on bail reform across many U.S. jurisdictions told us that, when
he asks judicial system stakeholders what “high risk” means in their
jurisdiction, many confess ignorance and others speculate that high risk
many mean a greater than 50% chance of reoffends.223 (In fact, even for
221. This is especially true where the Public Safety Assessment’s dashboard displays a “stop
sign” when a defendant’s new criminal activity is too high and is deemed to be an “elevated risk of
violence.” See LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT 10,
https://nccalj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Virginia-Bersch-PSA-State-of-North-Carolina.pdf
(2016) [https://perma.cc/7SP9-7WXM] (PowerPoint presentation).
222. Jay P. Singh, Predictive Validity Performance Indicators in Violence Risk Assessment: A
Methodological Primer, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 8, 19 (2013) (“[A] number of performance
indicators are available to researchers . . . the AUC has become ubiquitous in studies attempting to
establish predictive validity.”).
223. More generally, the vocabulary used in the pretrial risk context—“this person is a high
risk”—largely diverges from how individuals perceive the assessed risk. That is: though an
individual may be assessed as “high risk,” the rate of reoffense for the “high risk” group may
resemble a probability that is rather low, not “high.” Take the earlier CPAT example. The “highest
risk” category of failure to appear in the PSA is 40%. Within the internal logic of the pretrial risk
assessment tool and relative sample, 40% is “high risk.” But more generally, a 40% probability that
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the highest risk categories, the actual failure rates are much lower than
this).
Further, the process by which a society determines and formalizes
answers to how much risk to tolerate must be a democratic one. There is,
potentially, a strong incentive for certain actors within the criminal
justice system to perpetuate relatively high levels of pretrial detention.
This is especially true of private actors who contract with local
governments.224
This is not to say that local governments should be wary of expert
help available from private industry, just that those actors should not
play an outsized role in developing decision-making frameworks. Nor
should policymakers rely upon a decision-making framework
successfully developed and deployed in another jurisdiction. True, there
may also be a strong political incentive to rely on contractors. A
message that a framework, developed by experts, which has succeeded
elsewhere, might seem attractive. However, the question addressed is
about the community. Thus, the process should include elected
policymakers, judges, public defenders, individuals returning from
incarceration, advocates, prosecutors, and the general public.225 A broadbased coalition would not only likely enhance perceptions of a decisionmaking framework’s legitimacy, but also empower communities to stick
with their plan of reform after high-profile incidents of pretrial crime.
D.

Longer-term Dangers

Beyond the immediate concerns detailed above, a bail reform
movement predicated on the widespread adoption of pretrial risk
assessment also presents at least three longer-term dangers to the norms
some event will occur could easily be understood as “unlikely” or “doubtful.” See, e.g., RICHARDS
J. HEUER, JR., PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 154–55 (1999); Zonination, Perceptions
of Probability and Numbers - Gallery, GITHUB, https://github.com/zonination/perceptions
[https://perma.cc/96BZ-9JZS].
224. That is to say, so long as “problems” continue to exist, private actors can continue to sell
their services to help alleviate that problem.
225. Here, Mesa, Colorado actually serves as a good example. Officials developed a pretrial
working group which consisted of “Judges, Public Defenders, District Attorneys, Private Defense
Lawyers, Pretrial Services Officials, Mesa County Jail Officials, and Victim Advocates.” See MESA
CTY., MESA COUNTY EVIDENCE-BASED PRETRIAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE 6 (2015),
https://web.archive.org/web/20170202153208/http://www.apainc.org/wp-content/uploads/MesaCounty-Evidenced-Based-Pretrial-Implementation-Guide-1.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2018).
Ultimately, “new Guidelines were developed collaboratively, albeit through many heated and
confrontational meetings . . . . The Chief Judge, the District Attorney and the Sheriff signed this
document, which showed a strong collaborative framework. The public and private defenders also
showed support in the development and implementation of this document.” Id. at 11.
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and jurisprudence of pretrial justice. First, statistical risk assessment—
including future machine learning-based approaches—may insulate
poorly defined concepts of “dangerousness” from essential scrutiny.
Second, the embrace of a risk-based approach could ultimately trigger an
increase in preventive detention. Third, the constitutionality of
preventive detention will be left unexamined because pretrial risk
assessments tacitly presume that Salerno’s core holding was correct.
1.

Insulating Nebulous Concepts of “Dangerousness” From Scrutiny

One of the great ironies of the push to consider dangerousness at bail
is that none of the professional communities involved has seized the
mantle to define dangerousness. As Marc Miller and Norval Morris
argued, by initially considering predictions of dangerousness to be “‘the
province of psychiatry,’ lawyers foreclosed appropriate jurisprudential
consideration of the use of predictions.”226 That reliance came at a time
when psychiatrists disclaimed their ability as a profession to predict
future dangerousness.227 With no one stakeholder claiming the mantle,
courts began to allow “much greater reliance . . . on psychological
predictions of dangerousness than do the organized professions of
psychiatry and psychology.”228
This pattern of de facto abdication of responsibility by lawyers and
jurists continues today, but with the developers of risk assessment tools
stepping into the extra-judicial, expert role formerly filled by
psychologists.229 As risk assessment designers move from today’s
logistic regression-based techniques toward more complex machine
learning techniques, this may reinforce lawyers’ impression that they do
not belong at the table. If lawyers conceive predictions of pretrial failure
226. Marc Miller & Norval Morris, Predictions of Dangerousness: Ethical Concerns and
Proposed Limits, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 393, 404 (1987).
227. Brief for Am. Psychiatric Ass’n as Amicus Curiae at 12, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983) (No. 82-6080) (“The unreliability of psychiatric predictions of long-term future
dangerousness is by now an established fact within the profession.”).
228. Miller & Morris, supra note 226.
229. As an example, consider the Public Safety Assessment’s prediction of “New Violent
Criminal Activity.” “Violent criminal activity” might, on the surface, seem like a good
approximation for “dangerousness.” But, as detailed above, the PSA was developed on data from
nearly 200 different counties and cities and nearly 100 federal judicial districts, which, as a group,
do not share a uniform definition of violent felonies. Thus, when the PSA tool claims to predict
“New Violent Criminal Activity,” it may not be possible to state precisely what the PSA’s violence
model is even trying to predict. Put differently, the instrument may have as its outcome variable a
statistical amalgam that does not precisely match any real world definition of “violence,” and is
instead unaccountably intermediate among the range of definitions employed by the jurisdictions in
its training set.
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as the province of the data scientists who design new, advanced pretrial
risk assessment tools, they may, yet again, foreclose appropriate
jurisprudential consideration of the use of those predictions. Similarly,
courts may begin to place much greater reliance on what a sophisticated
computer program says, even though data scientists disclaimed their
program’s ability to predict pretrial failure for a specific individual.
2.

The Expansion of Preventive Detention

A bail regime predicated on pretrial risk assessment may reduce the
overall incidence of pretrial detention, especially where a risk
assessment replaces a money bail system. Simultaneously, however,
such a bail regime could lead to an increase in the number of defendants
who are preventively detained pretrial—meaning they were never
offered a path of release. For various reasons, explored more below,
such a development should concern bail reformers.
Consider Maryland. Statewide, one quarter of defendants are held
without bail after their initial appearance.230 One explanation for this
level of detention may be that only eleven out Maryland’s twenty-four
counties have pretrial service agencies.231 As a result, judges may feel
that they must detain some individuals that they would otherwise release
if the necessary supports or services were available. However, that
theory does not explain the results we see elsewhere in the state. In fact,
only two counties in Maryland use both pretrial risk assessment and
pretrial services.232 Montgomery County, the state’s largest, is one of
them.233 In September 2016, only 3.4% of defendants were held without
bail after their initial appearance.234 One year later, as of September
2017, 19.3% of defendants were held without bail after their initial
230. MD. JUDICIARY, IMPACT OF CHANGES TO PRETRIAL RELEASE RULES 33 (2018),
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/media/newsitem/reference/pdfs/impactofbailreviewre
port.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3LV-238E].
231. JAMES AUSTIN & JOHNETTE PEYTON, MARYLAND PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT DATA
COLLECTION STUDY app. B at 34 (2014), http://goccp.maryland.gov/pretrial/documents/2014pretrial-commission-final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8BQ-XDNS].
232. CHRISTINE BLUMAUER ET AL., ADVANCING BAIL REFORM IN MARYLAND: PROGRESS AND
POSSIBILITIES
26
(2018),
http://wws.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/content/Advancing_Bail_Reform_In_Maryland_2018Feb27_Digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZBQ7-EYQK].
233. Bail
System
Reform
FAQ,
M D.
ATT’Y
GEN.,
http://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/Pages/BailReform.aspx [https://perma.cc/57BE-4WBQ]
(“Montgomery County and St. Mary’s County are using a validated risk assessment tool for every
defendant.”).
234. MD. JUDICIARY, supra note 230, at 19.
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appearance.235 St. Mary’s County, the other Maryland County with both
pretrial risk assessment and services agency, saw the population of
defendants held without bail grow from 5.7% in September 2016 to
15.7% in September 2017.236
Similarly, three months after reforms were enacted in New Jersey,
12.4% of defendants were preventatively detained.237 As of December
2017, nearly 20% of defendants are detained without bail.238 Of course,
these statistics belie the greater number of detention motions filed. In
2017, New Jersey filed nearly 20,000 detention motions.239 The state has
kept apace in 2018: from January to September 30, 2018, nearly 17,000
detention motions were filed.240 Similarly, detention in Lucas County,
Ohio increased after the county implemented risk assessment.241 Overall,
even where risk assessment tools are adopted to advance explicitly
liberal reforms, nothing inherent to risk assessment guarantees liberal
results.242
235. Id. at 33.
236. Id. at 19, 33.
237. Judiciary Budget for Fiscal Year 2018: Hearing Before the Senate Budget and
Appropriations Committee, 217th Leg. 4 (N.J. 2017) (remarks of J. Glenn A. Grant, Acting
Administrative
Director
of
the
Courts),
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/
2017/SenateBudgetCommitteeRemarks_May_4_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/MWP9-X736].
238. Chart A: Initial Release Decisions for Criminal Justice Reform Eligible Defendants January
1 – December 31, 2017, supra note 210.
239. Chart B - Supplemental Graph: Detention Motions for Criminal Justice Reform Eligible
Defendants, Defendants Arrested in January 1 - December 31, 2017, N.J. COURTS,
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/assets/criminal/cjrreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3PWVGVTY] (indicating that 41% of motions were granted).
240. Chart B - Supplemental Graph: Detention Motions for Criminal Justice Reform Eligible
Defendants, Defendants Arrested in January 1, 2018 - September 30, 2018, N.J. COURTS,
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/cjrreport2018.pdf?cacheID=R6PoVYo
[https://perma.cc/M69V-RZDG] (showing that 39% of motions were granted).
241. MARIE VONNOSTRAND, LUNINOSITY, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY
ASSESSMENT, LUCAS COUNTY, OHIO 15 (observing that nearly 6% more defendants remained in
custody until the final disposition of their case).
242. Consider the immigration context (which is different in significant ways but supports the
broader point). In 2013, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deployed the Risk
Classification Assessment (RCA) system. Mark Noferi & Robert Koulish, The Immigration
Detention Risk Assessment, 29 GEO. IMM. L.J. 45, 48 (2014). The RCA forecast public safety and
flight risks to help ICE officials make release or detain recommendations. Id. The purpose of the
RCA was to “foster alternatives to detention” by ascertaining the “‘optimal pool of participants.’”
Id. at 59–60. Notably, immigration advocates “uniformly embraced risk assessment with only
qualified concerns.” Id. at 48. But the tool’s flight risk assessment was based on an interview with
questions that such individuals, justifiably, might not want to answer fully or truthfully, like family,
residency, and work authorization history. Ultimately, the RCA over-classified individuals as
medium and high flight risks and recommended less than 1% of arrestees for release in Baltimore.
Robert Koulish, Immigration Detention in the Risk Classification Assessment Era, 16 CONN. PUB.
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Perhaps California’s new Senate Bill 10 is most illustrative of this
concern: the law is rife with various detention provisions and triggers.
For example, the statute directs the newly-established Pretrial
Assessment Services to not release anyone assessed as high risk.243
Regardless of a person’s risk score, if they have violated a condition of
release in the past five years, the law commands Pretrial Assessment
Services to not release them.244 A high risk assessment score, combined
with one of four other factors, establishes a “rebuttable presumption that
no condition or combination of conditions of pretrial supervision will
reasonably assure public safety.”245 While individuals assessed as low
risk are supposed to be released,246 whether individuals assessed as
medium risk will be released or detained is subject to the local rules of
each superior court.247 More broadly, the law empowers prosecutors to
file a motion seeking prevent detention at any time if the prosecutor
believes there is a “substantial reason to believe that no nonmonetary
condition or combination of conditions of pretrial supervision will
reasonably assure protection of the public or a victim.”248 Notably,
“substantial reason” is not defined.249 Functionally, that discretion is
essentially unlimited.250
INT. L.J. 1, 5 (2016). Overall, though the RCA was supposed to aid ICE in fostering alternatives to
detention and alleviate bed shortages for detainees, it had exactly the opposite effect. See id. at 33.
243. Act of Aug. 28, 2018, ch. 244, § 1320.10(e)(1), 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West) (S.B. 10).
244. Id. § 1320.10(e)(11) (“Notwithstanding subdivisions (a) and (b), Pretrial Assessment
Services shall not release . . . [a] person who has violated a condition of pretrial release within the
past five years.”).
245. Id. § 1320(a)(2).
246. Id. § 1320.10(b).
247. Id. § 1320.11(a) (stating that the “local rule may further expand the list of offenses and
factors for which prearraignment release of persons assessed as medium risk is not permitted but
shall not provide for the exclusion of release of all medium-risk defendants by Pretrial Assessment
Services”). Local advocates have expressed substantial fear related to this provision. See Eric
Westervelt, California’s Bail Overhaul May Do More Harm Than Good, Reformers Say, NPR (Oct.
2, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/02/651959950/californias-bail-overhaul-may-do-more-harmthan-good-reformers-say [https://perma.cc/Y6FD-C9E7] (“Local counties based on their political
environment and based on their own tendencies around incarceration could increase the net of
pretrial detention by simply changing the dial and saying that not only are higher risk people now
excluded from release but we also think this broad swath we considered moderate risk would also
be excluded from release.” (quoting Raj Jayadev, co-founder of the social and legal advocacy group
Silicon Valley De-Bug)).
248. Act of Aug. 28, 2018, ch. 244, § 1320.18(5), 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West) (S.B. 10).
249. See Westervelt, supra note 247 (quoting Chesa Boudin, a public defender in San Francisco,
who notes that “[u]nder this law prosecutors have the discretion to seek pre-emptive detention of a
person with no criminal record charged with a low level misdemeanor”).
250. Cf. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 12, which states that “[a] person shall be released on bail by
sufficient sureties, except for” capital crimes, violent felonies, and felonies—where the latter two
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In upholding the 1984 Bail Reform Act, Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote that, “[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to
trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”251 Of course, this
stated principle rings hollow when compared to today’s stark reality.
True, an emergent consensus says that individuals should not be
detained before trial simply because they are too poor to pay their way
out. Yet, even in New Jersey, a pioneering state that eliminated money
bail in favor of widespread pretrial risk assessment, nearly one-fifth of
defendants are detained pretrial. Ultimately, reforms predicated on
pretrial risk assessment may expand the instances in which defendants
are preventively detained and denied bail pretrial.252
3.

Conceding Salerno

Only a few decades ago, the constitutional propriety of predicting
dangerousness pretrial was a matter of vociferous and widespread
debate. Yet, oddly, a practice that was once seen as fundamentally at
odds with the U.S. Constitution and our system of moral judgment is
now seen as an obvious, rational component of pretrial decisionmaking.253
Though there “has been relatively little innovation in the law and
scholarship on bail in the twenty years since Salerno,”254 the new era of
bail reform requires such innovation. In fact, the logic of a bail reform
model predicated on risk assessment “requires that judges have authority
to order pretrial preventive detention.”255 But today, only twenty-two
states, the District of Columbia, and the federal system authorize

offenses require other, particular findings, like “clear and convincing evidence that the person has
threatened another with great bodily harm and that there is a substantial likelihood that the person
would carry out the threat if released.”
251. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1986).
252. True, in many states before risk assessment reforms were implemented the “detention net”
was already wide. That is, risk assessment reforms did not drive the increase in charges in which a
prosecutor could file a preventive detention motion. But the adoption of risk assessment as a means
of reform, like in California, shines a bright light on that wide detention net because it will be the
only way in which the criminal justice system detains individuals pretrial—money bail will not offer
a sub rosa means to do so.
253. Mayson, supra note 24, at 495 (2018) (“[A]uthorities on pretrial law and policy—including
pretrial laws themselves—now universally identify . . . protecting the public from harm at the hands
of defendants” as a core purpose of the pretrial system).
254. Samuel Wiseman, Discrimination, Coercion, and the Bail Reform Act of 1984: The Loss of the
Core Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause, FORDHAM U. L.J. 121, 123 (2009).
255. Mayson, supra note 24, at 515.
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preventive detention, and those only in some circumstances.256
“[T]wenty-three states still guarantee a broad constitutional right to bail
and [would] have to amend their constitutions to authorize preventive
detention without bail.”257
Actuarial tools may, in short, offer bail reformers a Faustian tradeoff:
a new approach to pretrial justice that comes with chance (and a hope) of
reduced incarceration, but that also ratifies recent erosions of the
fundamental rights of the accused. This Article contends that reformers
need to be more attentive to this trade-off.
This question ultimately points back to Salerno, and the contested
question of whether that case was rightly decided. In examining Salerno,
scholars take particular issue with Salerno’s conclusion that preventive
detention would not be punitive, and with its treatment of the risk of
error in preventive detention decisions.
To determine whether or not a governmental act—in this case,
preventive pretrial detention—had punitive effect, the Salerno Court
applied Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.258 Under that case, the first step
was to examine the legislative history of the 1984 Bail Reform Act to
determine if there was explicit punitive intent. According to the Court in
Kennedy, if no punitive congressional intent is discernible, “each factor
of the [following] test is to be weighed”259:
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the
behavior to which it applied is already a crime, [6] whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned.260
Where “conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal
nature of a statute” is not available, the seven factors “must be
considered in relation to the statute on its face.”261
256. SUSAN KEILITZ & SARA SAPIA, NAT’L CTR. ON STATE COURTS, PREVENTIVE DETENTION 1
(2017).
257. Mayson, supra note 24, at 515–16.
258. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
259. Michael J. Eason, Eighth Amendment—What Will Become of the Innocent, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1048, 1061–62 (1988).
260. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168–69 (citations omitted).
261. Id. at 169 (emphasis added).
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But, as Professor Jean Koh Peters argues, the two key cases upon
which Salerno relied had already derogated from this test. In Bell v.
Wolfish,262 the Court stated that:
[a]bsent a showing of an express[ ] intent to punish . . . that
determination generally will turn on “whether an alternative
purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to
the alternative purpose assigned [to it].” Thus, if a particular
condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related
to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without
more, amount to “punishment.”263
By narrowly interpreting Kennedy this way, “the Bell Court
effectively amputated the first five Kennedy criteria.”264 Of utmost
importance, according to the Bell Court, was whether or not the policy in
question was reasonably related to a “‘legitimate state objective.’”265
After fully quoting the Kennedy test, Justice Rehnquist “supported his
drastic restatement of the test with neither precedent nor logic. In fact, he
did not even acknowledge the change.”266 Schall, in turn, relied on Bell’s
truncated version of the Kennedy criteria to find that juveniles could be
detained before trial to prevent their commission of conduct that would
be a crime if committed by an adult.267
This is the foundation upon which Salerno relies. So long as a statute
authorizing pretrial detention did not intend to be punitive, and so long
as it could be understood as “reasonably related” to a legitimate
governmental interest, it would not fall within the definition of
punishment.268
262. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
263. Id. at 538.
264. Jean Koh Peters, Schall v. Martin and the Transformation of Judicial Precedent, 31 B.C. L.
REV. 641, 652 (1990).
265. Id.
266. Eason, supra note 259, at 1063 (emphasis added).
267. But in doing so, the Court actually further cabined its analysis. Specifically, the Court in
Schall only evaluated whether or not the text of the New York Family Act statute evidenced
punitive intent, whereas the Court in Kennedy had examined legislative history that “revealed not
only a predecessor statute that had called the measure a ‘penalty,’ but also legislative memoranda
and floor debates replete with punitive language.” Peters, supra note 264, at 659.
268. See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of the InterestBalancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 537 (1987) (“[T]he Court’s twotiered framework [in Schall] seems to mandate the conclusion not only that every scheme of adult
pretrial detention enacted by state and federal legislatures is constitutional but that detention simply
on the basis of test scores would be constitutional as well.”); Margaret S. Gain, The Bail Reform Act
of 1984 and United States v. Salerno: Too Easy to Believe, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1371, 1378–84
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Under this formulation, once the Salerno Court determined that
Congress did not intend for pretrial detention to be a punitive restriction
in the Bail Reform Act,269 it only needed to identify an “alternate
purpose” for the restriction. There, the Salerno majority identified the
prevention of danger to public safety as a “legitimate regulatory goal.”270
The Salerno Court did not even mention the other five Kennedy
criteria.271 Nor does the majority acknowledge, as an earlier case had
held, that “even a clear legislative classification of a statute as ‘nonpenal’ would not alter the fundamental nature,” or effect, “of a plainly
penal statute.”272
Once it found that preventive pretrial detention was regulatory rather
than punitive, the Salerno Court next applied Mathews v. Eldridge.273
Mathews established a three-factor balancing test to determine what
kinds of procedures are required once an individual has been deprived of
life, liberty, or property on a regulatory basis:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and,
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.274
Generally, when the liberty or property interest is weightier, more
process is required. So, for example, depriving someone of their

(1989) (noting that so long as no congressional intent to punish could be discerned, the Court only
needed to find an “alternate purpose” and “determine that the means chosen for implementation
were not excessive in relation to that purpose”).
269. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987).
270. Id.
271. M. Gray Styers, Jr., United States v. Salerno: Pretrial Detention Seen Through the Looking
Glass, 66 N.C. L. REV. 616, 626 (1988).
272. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95 (1958). In other contexts, the Court has distinguished
between what Congress calls an action and the effect of that action. See, e.g., United States v.
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935) (“But even though the statute was not adopted to penalize
violations of the amendment, it ceased to be enforceable at the date of repeal if, in fact, its purpose
is to punish, rather than to tax.”); United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931) (“No mere
exercise of the art of lexicography can alter the essential nature of an act or a thing; and if an
exaction be clearly a penalty it cannot be converted into a tax by the simple expedient of calling it
such.”); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561–62 (1922) (“When, by its very nature the imposition is
a penalty, it must be so regarded.”); Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 613 (1903) (“[T]he use
of those words does not change the nature and character of the enactment.”).
273. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
274. Id. at 335.
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fundamental interest in freedom from detention would require
substantial process.275
But here again, Peters argues, an earlier case had distorted the
relevant precedent and set the stage for Salerno to disregard that
precedent. Schall had ignored the first part of Mathews’s second factor,
risk of error, “by focusing not upon the question of whether a prediction
can be accurate, but rather upon the far more simplistic question of
whether the prediction can be made or ‘attain[ed].’”276 To the extent that
the Schall majority confronted how predictions of future criminal
conduct are made, the Court recognized that “prediction of future
criminal conduct is ‘an experienced prediction based on a host of
variables’ which cannot be readily codified . . . . The decision is based
on as much information as can reasonably be obtained at the initial
appearance.”277 As Peters argued, if the Salerno Court were forced to
apply Mathews’s second criterion, “it would have been obliged to
evaluate not whether any detention are justified, but rather whether the
risk of erroneous detentions would be unacceptable.”278
But the Salerno Court did not do so. Following the Schall majority’s
lead, the Salerno Court’s analysis was largely framed as a two-pronged
balancing process: society’s interest, on the one hand, to prevent crime,
and the individual’s interest, on the other, in their liberty.279 The Salerno
Court neither “acknowledged nor discussed the [second]
Mathews . . . criteria, the risk of error in current procedure and the
probable value of additional or substitute procedures, respectively.”280
To the extent the Salerno Court even referenced the procedures of the
Bail Reform Act, it simply recited provisions of the Act, but did not
275. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (“The Mathews calculus then contemplates a
judicious balancing of these concerns, through an analysis of ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation’
of the private interest if the process were reduced and the ‘probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute safeguards.’” (citation omitted)).
276. Peters, supra note 264, at 677.
277. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 279 (1984).
278. Peters, supra note 264, at 690 (emphasis omitted).
279. Jack F. Williams, Process and Prediction: A Return to a Fuzzy Model of Pretrial Detention,
79 MINN. L. REV. 325, 363 (1994) (“Again, the Court exhaustively considered treatment of the
government’s interests while only begrudgingly recognizing an adult individual’s interest to be free
from governmental restraint. Rhetorically, to mask the basis of the decision, the losing interest
ought to receive more time than the winning one. In Salerno, this rhetoric is not the case.”); see also
Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Detention and the Failure of the Interest-Balancing Approaches to
Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 511 n.1 (1986) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s current approach to
the due process clause has tilted too far toward interest balancing and too far from historic concepts
of individual freedom.”).
280. Peters, supra note 264, at 686.
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examine whether “additional or substitute” procedures held any probable
value.281 Without any citation, the Court proclaimed that “the procedures
by which a judicial officer evaluates the likelihood of future
dangerousness [under the Bail Reform Act] are specifically designed to
further the accuracy of that determination.”282
Worse, whatever one thinks of the safeguards that the Bail Reform
Act of 1984 provides, they are irrelevant when examining the “‘probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguard,’ if indeed
no procedures, no matter how intricate, could ever make the procedure
more accurate.”283 By ignoring the second part of the Mathews test, the
Salerno Court avoided squarely addressing whether or not predictions of
dangerousness could ever be tolerably accurate.284
Of course, since Salerno, the Supreme Court “reversed course” on the
application of Mathews in matters of state criminal procedures.285 In
Medina v. California,286 the Court held that “a state rule of criminal
procedure not governed by a specific rule set out in the Bill of Rights
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if it
offends a fundamental and deeply rooted principle of justice.”287
Whether Mathews’s balancing test applies, or Medina’s “principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience”288 standard applies, the
accuracy of a prediction of future danger should be core to a due process
analysis.289 That’s especially true for a pretrial justice system based on a
risk assessment tool. The risk of a pretrial risk assessment tool
mislabeling someone as risky based on old and otherwise nonrepresentative data—and thus keeps them in jail for longer, or makes it
more likely that they will commit crimes in the future—raises significant
issues under Mathews or Medina.
281. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
282. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987).
283. Peters, supra note 264, at 690 (emphasis added).
284. Charles P. Ewing, Schall v. Martin: Preventive Detention and Dangerousness Through the
Looking Glass, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 173 (1985) (arguing that, based on a survey of the literature,
predictions of violent and criminal behavior are wrong more often than they are right).
285. Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL. REV. 1, 15 (2006).
286. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
287. Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1258 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring).
288. Medina, 505 U.S. at 445 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)).
289. Under Mathews the relative accuracy of a risk assessment—as compared to another risk
assessment, or other procedures—is of significant importance. Under Medina, the “fundamental and
deeply rooted principle of justice” is presumption of innocence. Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1258. There,
what matters is the process by which that presumption is rebutted. See id. at 1255 (“‘[A]xiomatic
and elementary,’ the presumption of innocence ‘lies at the foundation of our criminal law.’”
(quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895))).
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Further, if a bail system centered on pretrial risk assessment does, in
some instances, lead to a higher incidence of preventive detention, it is
all the more urgent for reformers to squarely address whether or not
Salerno was rightly decided.
Even if one were to agree with the core holdings of Salerno—that the
Constitution does not provide an affirmative right to bail and does not
definitively prohibit preventative detention—several pressing questions
remain open and underexplored. First, Salerno said nothing about “what
degree of risk it thought constitutionally sufficient to justify
detention.”290 That question is perhaps “the most important [element] of
risk assessment . . . because it marks the compromise between the
presumption of innocence, decarceration, and public safety.”291
If it were determined that judges or pretrial risk assessment tools
cannot predict dangerousness with adequate reliability, “pretrial
detention [might] not be rationally related to the goal of reducing pretrial
crime.”292 Finally, Salerno dictates that “detention prior to trial . . . is the
carefully limited exception.”293 A risk-based bail system seemingly
requires some defendants to be detained, without ever having been
offered a path of release. But how many such cases are allowable until it
can be no longer be said that detention is the “carefully limited
exception?”
Of course, risk assessment tools themselves cannot “answer [the]
normative question at the heart of contemporary pretrial justice . . . how
certain must we be that the person will commit a crime or not appear in
court?”294 Instead, bail reform predicated on risk assessment means that
answers to this question are all the more urgent and necessary.295

290. Mayson, supra note 24, at 498.
291. Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal Sentencing, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1145 (2018).
292. Eason, supra note 259, at 1065.
293. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
294. Note, supra note 291, at 1145.
295. Here, Sandra Mayson’s recent work deserves special note. Mayson argues that
[T]here is no clear, relevant distinction between defendants and non-defendants who are
equally dangerous . . . there is no constitutional text or doctrine that clearly grants the state
more expansive preventive authority over defendants than non-defendants. . . . [Further], the
practical justifications proffered to support the special preventive restraint of defendants are, at
best, incomplete.
Mayson, supra note 24, at 499. Given that there is no moral or practical distinction, and like cases
should be treated similarly, Mayson develops a “parity principle,” which “holds that the state has no
greater authority to preventively restrain a defendant than it does a non-defendant who poses an
equal risk.” Id. Overall, Mayson argues “[g]iven the trajectory of pretrial reform, it is both an
important and an opportune time to clarify the contours of the state’s pretrial powers.” Id. at 500.
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IV. ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES
A.

Pretrial Reform Without Risk Assessment

Although pretrial risk assessments are often described as a necessary
or natural focus for bail reform efforts, this focus is misplaced.
Considering the arguments detailed above, and on the basis of the
preliminary evidence currently available, it is not safe to assume that
pretrial risk assessment instruments will help to reduce today’s
widespread overuse of pretrial incarceration, or to mitigate the
longstanding racial disparities in pretrial justice.296
Other policy changes may more effectively and immediately serve the
goals of decarceration and fairness in pretrial justice. These other steps
include:
Automatic release of broad categories of defendants: As detailed
above, defendants appear to be best able to succeed on release when they
avoid any period at all of pretrial incarceration. Policies that provide for
the summary, automatic release on recognizance of defendants charged
with certain crimes, such as for example all defendants whose most
serious charge is a misdemeanor, could help to ensure that large numbers
of defendants are positioned to avoid pretrial incarceration and its
harmful effects.
High procedural burdens for imposing pretrial detention or
supervisory conditions: In New Jersey, for example, one major focus of
reform efforts has been to encourage litigation of pretrial release
decisions by requiring robust pretrial detention hearings.297 Practitioners
report that these heightened evidentiary standards have played a central
role in reducing the use of pretrial incarceration.

296. Our suggestions here largely accord with the recommendations of more than 100 civil rights,
digital rights, and community-based groups, who argue that “[r]eal reform addresses underlying
structural inequalities, rather than attempting to triage a structurally flawed system. Jurisdictions
can—and should—abolish systems of monetary bail, combat mass incarceration, make meaningful
investments in communities, and pursue pretrial fairness and justice without adopting such tools.”
See LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE SHARED STATEMENT, supra note 124, at 2. Through our work at
Upturn, we played a research and advisory role in the development of this statement.
297. For example, New Jersey Court Rule 3:4-2(c) requires the prosecution to turn over any
available preliminary incident reports, affidavits of probable cause, “all statements or reports
relating to the affidavit of probable cause, . . . all statements or reports relating to additional
evidence the State relies on to establish probable cause at the hearing,” statements related to
community safety when determining whether to release the defendant, and all exculpatory evidence.
N.J. CT. R. 3:4-2(c)(2). But see State v. Dickerson, 177 A.3d 788 (2018) (limiting the discovery the
state must automatically make available to defendants facing a pretrial detention hearing).
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Text message reminders and other supportive pretrial services:
Accused people are more likely to succeed upon release if they are
reminded of upcoming court dates. Reminders should be a standard
practice for all those released. Other services designed to support
success, such as transportation assistance for people who may need help
getting to court, can likewise make success on release more likely and
thus make release more attractive.
Front-end reforms that address excessive and racially disparate
charging patterns: Policing changes, such as issuing citations in lieu of
arrest, as well as investments in non-police responses to public safety
problems, may help to reduce the number of people who face criminal
charges in the first place, and to reduce racial disparities in the pretrial
population. Similarly, electoral efforts that support the election of
progressive prosecutors can help create a world of more measured
prosecutorial decision-making and hence less incarceration.
We do not believe that the above steps should be seen as flawless or
guaranteed solutions to the deeply rooted injustices of today’s bail
system. In fact, such steps can at times have paradoxical or unintended
consequences, no less than other social policies.298 However, these steps
do speak directly to the challenge of pretrial incarceration, and we
believe it would be reasonable for advocates and reform-minded system
actors to shift their change-making efforts to focus on steps like these.
B.

Where Risk Assessment Is Used: Relevant, Timely Data

1.

Risk Assessment Tools Should Always Rely on Recent, Local Data

Jurisdictions that are reforming bail practices should always rely on
recent data, gathered after their other pretrial reforms have taken root, to
construct or calibrate their risk assessment tools. Existing “off the shelf”
risk assessment tools, whose predictions assume that defendants still
face the same long odds of succeeding outside jail, should not be used
without adjustment in jurisdictions where those risks have been

298. For example, Maryland Court Rule 4-216.1—which says that judges may not impose a
financial condition of release if that condition would lead to the person’s pretrial detention—is on
its face a progressive policy that should help ensure fewer people are detained pretrial. MA. CT. R.
4-216.1. However, that policy has had its own unintended consequences. While 6% more
defendants have been released on their own recognizance, nearly 12% more defendants were held
without bail. Data suggests that, “in the absence of [pretrial service] options, many judges are opting
to hold defendants in jail pretrial rather than release them on their own recognizance.” See
BLUMAUER ET AL., supra note 232, at 14.
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mitigated. Risk assessment tools developed solely from historical data
that predates the enactment of significant risk-mitigating reforms will
not reflect defendants’ new odds of success on release and could, in turn,
hamper overall reform efforts.
What counts as “recent data” will vary, depending on context. For
example, a jurisdiction’s decision to move from a money bail schedule
to a system that presumptively releases all misdemeanor defendants
would be a major risk mitigating reform, and no risk assessment
instrument should be used unless it can reflects the outcomes of a
presumptive-release regime. What’s ultimately important is for
jurisdictions to track changing patterns of risks and outcomes.
Recent data is indispensable, but earlier data can potentially be
responsibly used, given certain conditions. The critical concept is that
the scoring process must evolve to reflect declining risks of pretrial
failure. Models based partly on older data can be adjusted to reflect more
recent developments. Adjustment is possible because the defendants
who get released are themselves a diverse group, with different (albeit
low) levels of failure risk, and their outcomes can be compared both
before and after reforms. If released defendants are grouped by the risk
score they were assigned at arraignment, so that there are separate
groups of released defendants who earned scores of 1, 2, and 3 out of ten
(say), the groups should each have different—presumably increasing—
rates of pretrial failure. Those rates can be compared both before and
after a reform to assess how scores may need to be adjusted.
A regression that compared the failure rates of these before and after
reform could reveal by how much, and for which offenders, risks have
now been reduced. A regression linking scored risk level to post-reform
failure rate can reveal when a jurisdiction has succeeded in reducing the
actual level of risk associated with each score. The jurisdiction can then
either recalibrate the risk scale or simply begin to release more
defendants at the higher score levels (which have come to betoken a
lower true level of risk than they did initially).
Ultimately, if jurisdictions are to truly rely on and promote “evidencebased practices,” they must gather the evidence first. For a pretrial risk
assessment tool to promote evidence-based practice, the tool must
incorporate recent data that reflects the fact that bail reform policies
have mitigated the risks defendants face once released. If jurisdictions
cannot, or will not, wait for fresh data to introduce risk assessment, then
they must vigorously collect data on the failure rates of defendants
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before and after reform.299 This would empower policymakers to update
the model early on and, once they do so, they should weigh the recency
of post-reform data higher within the model.
2.

Regularly Compare Predictions Against Outcomes

It is vitally important that jurisdictions track risk scores and
subsequent outcomes.300 This may seem like a simple or obvious
suggestion, but current practice lags woefully far behind it. Data
collection practices on pretrial outcomes at the county level are
notoriously varied, often haphazard, and sometimes totally absent.301
Some agencies do not or cannot calculate failure to appear rates or
pretrial rearrest rates.302 Even more basic information, like the average
length of jail stay for detained pretrial defendants, is sometimes

299. We expand on the benefits of vigorous pretrial outcome data collection in the next section.
300. Stevenson, supra note 126, at 59 (“When a new technique is adopted, outcomes should be
monitored to see if the desired effects were achieved. If they were not, adjustments can be made
accordingly. In this paradigm, a method would be neither championed nor pilloried until its impacts
in practice are clearly understood.”).
301. A 2014 report by the Governor’s Commission to Reform Maryland’s Pretrial System
identified the following gaps in available data about Maryland’s pretrial population, which it labeled
“Unanswered Questions”:
How many defendants post bond? How many defendants are released on pretrial supervision?
How many defendants released pretrial are arrested prior to trial? Of those defendants on
pretrial supervision, how many fail to appear for court or get arrested prior to trial? What is the
risk level of each defendant detained pretrial in jail? How many pretrial defendants are
detained in jail who could not post bond? What was the bond amount? What is the average
length of stay of pretrial defendants detained in jail?
COMM’N TO REFORM MD’S PRETRIAL SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT 15 (2014),
http://goccp.maryland.gov/pretrial/documents/2014-pretrial-commission-final-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U37Z-8SAM].
302. See, e.g., OHIO CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, AD HOC COMM. ON BAIL & PRETRIAL
SERVS.,
FINAL
REPORT
&
RECOMMENDATIONS
18
(2017),
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/Sentencing/Materials/2017/March/finalAdHocBailRepo
rt.pdf [https://perma.cc/JSY4-TJVZ] (“As in other areas of Ohio’s criminal justice system, data
regarding pretrial decisions, agencies, and outcomes is rarely collected. Less than 20% of
respondents to the Ad Hoc survey collect data on failure to appear rates and even less are collecting
data regarding arrests for crimes committed while on release pretrial. The Ad Hoc Committee
recommends a dedicated and concerted effort to increase data collection and analysis for all facets
of the bail and pretrial system in Ohio. At a minimum, the committee recommends that collection of
appearance rates, safety rates, and concurrence rates (how often a judge accepts a pretrial service
agency recommendation) be mandated for each jurisdiction.”). Four of fifty-six programs with
survey responses in Ohio said they calculate failure to appear rates; zero of fifty-six programs with
survey responses said they calculate pretrial rearrest rates, and two of fifty-six calculate release
rates. Id. at 247, 251, 253.
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unavailable or not tracked.303 Others alter the very pretrial failure rates
they seek to measure through technological errors.304
Data on the risk scores and subsequent outcomes, whether for all
defendants or for a representative sample of them, is necessary in order
to understand the relationship between scores and true levels of risk.
Without such data, there is no way to know whether the risk assessment
data is systematically wrong about the risks posed by defendants. Such
regular monitoring would not only allow jurisdictions to evaluate how
well their risk assessment tool classifies risk, but also empower
jurisdictions to track how reform efforts may be changing risk levels. It
is also important for a defendant’s risk assessment prediction, their
subsequent outcome, and case file to be linked. This would make it
possible to analyze how predictions or outcomes correlate with other
features, such as a defendant’s race, socioeconomic status, recent
rearrests, or type of pretrial monitoring. Doing so would help ensure that
risk assessment tools lead to more equitable outcomes across race,
gender, and socioeconomic status.305
Such tracking should also include data on how often judges concur
with the risk assessment tool’s recommendations, and ideally on their
reasons for diverging when they do. By tracking concurrence,
divergence, and why a judge diverged, policymakers may be able to
create a positive feedback loop. The more that judges understand how a
risk assessment tool works, and the more that the developers of a risk
assessment tool understand how judges use—or do not use—their tool,
the better.
Further, validation studies should not stand in the way of continuous
monitoring. Pretrial risk assessment validation studies take time simply
because criminal cases themselves take a long time to resolve. In order
for an entire six-month period of risk assessment predictions to be
analyzed, one must observe each case until disposition. Such observation

303. Id. at 88, 94–95.
304. In Harris County, newly approved court rules schedule many hearings for within one
business day. The county’s computer system, however, still tells misdemeanor defendants to return
to court in seven days. Misinformed defendants are missing their court dates, which may make the
otherwise successful reform look like a failure. See Bryce Covert, Are Harris County Officials
Trying to “Sabotage” Bail Reform with Misleading Data?, MEDIUM: IN JUST. TODAY (Dec. 8,
2017),
https://medium.com/in-justice-today/advocates-say-harris-county-officials-are-trying-tosabotage-bail-reform-with-misleading-data-81a1292edca1 [https://perma.cc/6VP8-8SYQ].
305. More than 100 civil rights groups recently called for similar requirements, demanding that
revalidation of risk assessment tools check for predictive validity and differences across race,
gender, and other protected characteristics. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE SHARED
STATEMENT, supra note 123, at 8–9.
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may last a year and a half, or longer. Accordingly, jurisdictions must
resist the temptation to blind themselves from viewing pretrial outcome
data until each case is resolved. Monthly reporting—though offering an
incomplete view—can still provide valuable insight. Overall, validation
studies and continuous monitoring need not stand in each other’s way.306
Many jurisdictions may lack the technological infrastructure,
expertise, and other resources to pay attention to whether their pretrial
risk assessments are right or wrong. Such challenges, where they exist,
must not be considered a warrant to ignore the question. To the extent
policymakers imagine that they can combine bad data with good
prediction, a shift in perspective is essential. Data infrastructure is not an
afterthought, but an indispensable pillar of the responsible deployment
of statistical predictions in pretrial justice.307
3.

Focus on the Risks that Matter Most

Pretrial risk assessment tools generally forecast two outcomes: failure
to appear and rearrest. It is important to interrogate the gap between the
data jurisdictions have and the questions jurisdictions ask of that data.308
Currently, forty-five states and the District of Columbia permit either
pretrial detention or release subject to restrictions “[a]fter a finding that a
defendant poses a danger to an individual or community.”309 However,
most of today’s risk assessment tools only predict future rearrest. As
others have observed, the two are not the same. While rearrest for a
violent crime might signal danger to an individual or community,
rearrest writ large does not. Correlates of rearrest do not so much
measure “dangerousness” as they measure—and anticipate—future
contact with the criminal justice system.310
306. Civil rights advocates called for validation to occur “annually at the least, with the ideal
being quarterly.” Id. at 9.
307. See, e.g., ERIKA PARKS ET AL., URBAN INST., LOCAL JUSTICE REINVESTMENT 12 (2016) (“A
critical component of justice reinvestment is data analysis and data-driven decision-making . . . . To
improve data capacity, local sites developed data warehouses, integrated data systems, data
dashboards, and jail population and cost-benefit projection tools.”).
308. See LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS, SIX THINGS TO KNOW
ABOUT
ALGORITHM-BASED
DECISION-MAKING
TOOLS
1
(2018),
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-justice/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-6Things.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LGB4-UP45] (“‘[R]isk scores’ from algorithmic risk assessment tools have little
bearing on the risks that really matter to communities.”).
309. Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 62, at 512.
310. DELBERT S. ELLIOTT, CTR. FOR THE STUDY & PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, LIES, DAMN LIES
AND ARREST STATISTICS 11 (1995), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.182.
9427&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/6L6U-4BZ2].
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For example, most rearrests pretrial appear to be for technical
violations, not new felonies or violent crimes.311 Federal data from
2012–2014 show that for defendants released to the community pretrial
who had at least one violation while on release, technical violations of
bail conditions represented the vast majority of all violations in which a
new offense was charged.312 Between 2008 and 2010, 90% of all pretrial
violations by federal defendants released were technical violations.313
The technical conditions of bail are often mundane: curfews, travel
restrictions, drug tests, and even keep-your-job requirements.
Other bail reforms will make it all the more important to delineate
technical violations from new violent arrests. Jurisdictions will likely
release more defendants pretrial by increasing the use of non-financial
conditions of release.314 In all likelihood, this will increase the incidence
of rearrest for technical violation of release conditions.
Ultimately, communities should determine which public safety risks
matter most to them, and researchers, practitioners, and policymakers
should act accordingly. Should decisions be based on “the risk of the
defendant committing another crime pretrial or the risk of the defendant
committing specific crimes pretrial (e.g., violent offences)?”315 And

311. A “technical violation” of conditional release, benign as it may sound, can also carry serious
and immediate consequences (beyond making the person appear riskier in future risk assessments).
The American Bar Association’s Pretrial Release General Principles say that a “person who has
been released on conditions and who has violated a condition of release, including willfully failing
to appear in court, should be subject to a warrant for arrest, modification of release conditions,
revocation of release, or an order of detention, or prosecution on available criminal charges.” ABA,
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 19 (3d ed. 2006).
312. MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2012 STATISTICAL TABLES 15 tbl.3.3 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs12st.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RH6N-KQ79]; MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS,
2013
STATISTICAL
TABLES
15
tbl.3.3
(2017),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs13st.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H8QZ-XDPM];
MARK
MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2014 - STATISTICAL TABLES 15
tbl.3.3 (2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs14st.pdf [https://perma.cc/38MP-7PJK].
313. THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL RELEASE AND MISCONDUCT IN
FEDERAL
DISTRICT
COURTS,
2008–2010,
at
1
(2012),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prmfdc0810.pdf [https://perma.cc/37CH-XDDT].
314. That is at least already an observable trend in federal-level data—80% of defendants
released on personal recognizance received some set of pretrial conditions, while only 40% of
defendants with a surety bond release received pretrial conditions. Id. at 9; see also SANTA CRUZ
CTY. PROB. DEP’T, ALTERNATIVES TO CUSTODY REPORT 2015 (2016) (detailing a decrease in the
ADP in the first half of the year, followed by a modest increase in the next half). But see id. at 11
(“[F]ollowing modifications of the PSA-Court decision making framework, in the first quarter of
CY2016 saw a dramatic rise of the [Average Daily Population on pretrial supervision]—almost
double of previous years.”).
315. MAMALIAN, supra note 132, at 13.
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though developers of risk assessment tools sometimes concede that
rearrest data is an imperfect measure, they generally defend it as the one
of the few measures available—or, the least bad option available. But
distinguishing new violent crimes from technical violations is a bare
minimum requirement for responsible use of these tools. Similar
critiques can be made about failure to appear data. While data on failure
to appear does not suffer from sampling bias,316 the reasons defendants
fail to appear vary widely and should not be construed to suggest flight
risk. Thus, generalized failure to appear data flattens the underlying
circumstances.
How might jurisdictions interrogate the gap between the data
jurisdictions have and the questions jurisdictions ask of that data? As a
start, jurisdictions should demand aggregate-level reporting of the
development sample or training data for any pretrial risk assessment
tool. Such a report should at least disclose: the breakdown of rearrests by
charge, severity of charge, age, race, and gender. Failures to appear
should also be explained on some metric, like whether the failures are
persistent or sporadic. Such a report might tell policymakers that there is
a significant gap between the data upon which a risk assessment tool is
based and the questions that truly matter to them. Or it might not. Either
way, such information is critical for jurisdictions to make an informed
decision on whether or not to adopt a risk assessment tool.
Moreover, the risks that matter most might not just be the risks of a
defendant’s rearrest or failure to appear. As Crystal Yang recently
argued, jurisdictions could also consider the risks that pretrial detention
might worsen a defendant’s circumstances.317 In imagining a “netbenefit” assessment, Yang argues that risk assessment tools could be
used to “maximize social welfare in the bail setting [by] . . . also us[ing]
data to predict the likelihood of harms associated with detention.”318
Given the emergent literature on the staggering downstream costs of
pretrial detention, such a concept is more than worthy of future
research.319

316. That is to say, a person either did or did not show up to a court date or hearing. A court does
not only observe a select class of failures to appear.
317. Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1488 (2017).
318. Id. (“For example, data on detained defendants can be used to identify factors that are most
predictive of agreed-upon harms: whether someone is wrongfully convicted, whether someone loses
their home, whether someone is unable to find employment in the formal labor market, and whether
someone commits crime in the future.”).
319. Id. at 1489–90. Though Yang does not advocate for the practicality of her suggestion, she
does note that “[u]ltimately, by using data to predict both the costs and benefits of pre-trial detention
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C.

Where Risk Assessment Is Used: Strong, Inclusive Governance

1.

Risk Assessments and Frameworks Should Not Recommend
Detention

For the strongest chance at reducing incarceration—and in order to
keep preventive detention within constitutional limits—policymakers
must ensure that risk assessment instruments and their associated
decision-making frameworks do not supplant the adversary hearing and
specific findings of fact that are constitutionally necessary before a
defendant can be preventively detained. Finding that the defendant is a
member of a collectively high risk group is the most specific observation
that risk assessment instruments can make about any person. And such a
finding does not answer, or even address, the question of whether
preventive detention is the only way to reasonably assure that person’s
reappearance or the preservation of public safety. That question must be
asked specifically about the individual whose liberty is at stake—and it
must be answered in the affirmative in order for detention to be
constitutionally justifiable.
In practical terms, this means that a responsible and well-governed
risk assessment instrument will never go so far as to propose detention
or suggest that the defendant not be released. Instead, for those deemed
highest risk, the decisonmaking framework can and should propose that
a hearing be conducted to assess what combination of conditions can
reasonably assure the reappearance of the accused and public safety. It is
the role of the judge or magistrate at such a hearing—not the role of a
risk assessment instrument—to decide whether the defendant should be
detained.
In addition to being prudent policy, our recommendation on this point
is also essential as a matter of statistical practice. Today’s risk
assessment instruments make no attempt to measure the change in risk
that is caused by the supportive services or supervisory conditions that a
judge may impose in a particular case. And yet, it is precisely this
modified level of risk that the judge must assess as the basis for a
detention decision. (Another term for this change is the “responsiveness”
of the defendant, as noted above in our discussion of risk assessment
frameworks.) No risk assessment score and no decision-making
recommendation should in and of itself trump a person’s presumption of
release. Likewise, such scores should never serve as prima facie
for each defendant, jurisdictions could create ‘net-benefit’ assessment tools using largely the same
set-up already employed for risk-assessment tools.” Id. at 1490.
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evidence that no condition of release would assure someone’s
appearance or public safety.320 After all, responsiveness to conditions is
not something these tools measure.
This recommendation is broadly endorsed: Civil rights groups have
made this point directly,321 and so too have the largest proponents
assessment tools. For example, in new materials, the Arnold Foundation
instructs that the decision-making framework—what it calls a “release
conditions matrix”—should not include detention among its
recommendations 322 Instead,
If the judicial officer determines that a person is eligible for
detention . . . under state law, the officer must hold a hearing in
order to lawfully detain the person pretrial. [Such hearings must]
adhere to certain fundamental legal foundations for detention,
most of which are articulated in United States v. Salerno.323
The foundation “encourages [jurisdictions] to understand the law in
order to use the PSA in the most legally sound manner; this necessarily
includes holding a due process hearing prior to intentional pretrial
detention.”324 We emphatically join in that particular piece of advice.
2.

Risk Assessments and Frameworks Must Be Public

Risk assessment models used in the courtroom pretrial—and the
process used to develop and test them—must be public. Of course,
making public the risk assessment models and the process used to
develop and test them would do much to alleviate due process concerns.
Risk assessment tools that rely on trade secret claims, like Equivant’s
COMPAS risk assessment tool, have already seen due process
challenges. But it is not just defendants who fear what may be happening
behind the curtain of trade secrecy. Judges may also be wary.
320. The recent State v. Mercedes decision in New Jersey supports this view. See State v.
Mercedes, 183 A.3d 914, 931 (N.J. 2018) (Albin, J., concurring) (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2018) (“The pretrial
services recommendation, through the court rule, could have operated to undermine the rebuttable
presumption favoring pretrial release.”).
321. See LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE SHARED STATEMENT, supra note 124.
322. GUIDE TO THE RELEASE CONDITIONS MATRIX, supra note 217, at 1–2 (“On its own, the PSA
does not direct a judicial officer to release or detain a person or recommend a presumptive level of
pretrial release (or its associated conditions) . . . . Detention is not included in the matrix because
eligibility for detention is based on state law, and the matrix becomes relevant only after a judicial
officer decides a person will be released.”).
323. LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT IMPLEMENTATION GUIDES:
8. GUIDE TO THE PRETRIAL DECISION FRAMEWORK 10, https://www.psapretrial.org/implementation
/guides/managing-risk/guide-to-the-pretrial-decision-framework (last visited Nov. 6, 2018).
324. Id.
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For example, in State v. Loomis,325 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
became the first court to address the relationship between trade secrets in
risk assessments and due process principles in sentencing. Although the
Court ultimately rejected Loomis’ due process claim, one Justice noted
in a concurrence that “this court’s lack of understanding of COMPAS
was a significant problem in the instant case. At oral argument, the court
repeatedly questioned both the State’s and defendant’s counsel about
how COMPAS works. Few answers were available.”326
Though Loomis involved the use of a risk assessment tool’s findings
at sentencing, the same problems apply pretrial. Early evidence suggests
that judges diverge from the recommendations of risk assessment tools
at rates that should concern reformers and policymakers alike.327 One
way to ensure that judicial concurrence rates with risk assessment
recommendations stay high is to ensure that judges are involved from
the outset with the development, design, and testing of a new pretrial
risk assessment system. A criminal justice system that is better
understood and debated by all stakeholders will not only enjoy greater
public support, but also enjoy greater legitimacy from all of those actors.
Higher perceptions of legitimacy when it comes to pretrial risk
assessment likely means higher concurrence rates.
Algorithmic trade secrecy is just one problem, however. For example,
the PSA is a fairly simple system that can be implemented without a
325. 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).
326. Id. at 774 (Wis. 2016) (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
327. Early evidence indicates a high rate of judicial overrides, in which judges depart from the
recommendations of a risk assessment tool. A report by the Cook County sheriff’s office reportedly
found that Cook County judges diverged from the recommendations of their risk assessment tool
more than 80% of the time. See Frank Main, Cook County Judges Not Following Bail
Recommendations: Study, CHI. SUN-TIMES (July 3, 2016), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/cookcounty-judges-not-following-bail-recommendations-study-find/ [https://perma.cc/U8Y8-GNCK];
see also Stevenson, supra note 126, at 17–36.
Other evidence suggests that these diversions are not randomly distributed. HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, “NOT IN IT FOR JUSTICE”: HOW CALIFORNIA’S PRETRIAL DETENTION AND BAIL SYSTEM
UNFAIRLY PUNISHES POOR PEOPLE 93 (2017) (“[J]udges disregard release recommendations,
setting bail for as much as 75 percent of all defendants determined to be ‘low risk.’”); SANTA CRUZ
CTY. PROB. DEP’T, supra note 314, at 2, 8. Santa Cruz County piloted PSA-Court from July 2014 to
June 2015. During 2015, the Superior County Court considered 1,437 recommendations. Id. Six
hundred and forty-four PSA-Court recommendations were for release and 793 were for detention.
Judges departed from the release recommendations a little more than half of the time—53% of the
time—but only departed from detain recommendations 16% of the time. Most of the departures, in
other words, were in the direction of greater detention. Id. Cf. MATTHEW DEMICHELE ET AL., WHAT
DO CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS THINK ABOUT RISK ASSESSMENT AT PRETRIAL? 33 tbl.5
(noting that in a survey of criminal justice actors, all judges responded that they “often” or
“sometimes” agree with the PSA recommendation and the vast majority of judges said that the PSA
informed their release/bail decisions).
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computer. And it appears that the Arnold Foundation is benevolently
motivated—it provides the system free of charge. But, today, there is
still a substantial amount that’s unknown about PSA. As Robert
Brauneis and Ellen Goodman recently observed, the Arnold Foundation
has not revealed how it developed its algorithms, why it used the data it
chose to develop the system, whether it performed validation, and, if it
did, what the outcomes were.328 Nor has it disclosed, in quantitative
terms, what “low risk” and “high risk” meant.
In order to see if court systems had this information, Brauneis and
Goodman sent open records requests to sixteen different courts, only to
largely be stymied.329 Of the five courts that responded to their request
by providing documents, four of them “stated that they could not provide
information about PSA because that information was owned and
controlled by the Arnold Foundation,” thanks to a Memorandum of
Understanding “which contained identical language prohibiting the
courts from disclosing any information about the PSA program.”330 Such
contractual confidentiality requirements may have some benefits. But
such confidentiality can also be detrimental and worsen perceptions of
procedural legitimacy.
Definitions of input data and outcome measures must also be public.
By this we mean that designers should disclose precisely what a tool
attempts to predict, and for what time period, based on what inputs.
For example, one of the input factors that the PSA uses to calculate a
defendant’s risk of rearrest (as well as the more specific risk of rearrest
for violent crimes) is whether the defendant has been previously
convicted of a “violent” crime.331 The specific crimes that can be
prosecuted vary from one jurisdiction to another. Thus, in order to
produce a PSA score, a jurisdiction must decide which of the specific
charges in its local laws will be counted as “violent” crimes during
scoring—by creating what the Arnold Foundation calls a Violent
Offense List.332 This process is supposed to consist of the jurisdiction
328. Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, 20
YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 138 (2018).
329. Id.
330. Id. at 138–39.
331. See LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT: RISK FACTORS AND
FORMULA 2 (2016), https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/PSA-Risk-Factors-andFormula.pdf [https://perma.cc/UNG8-U7C8].
332. LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT IMPLEMENTATION GUIDES:
10.
GUIDE
TO
THE
PSA
VIOLENT
OFFENSE
LIST
1
(2018),
https://www.psapretrial.org/implementation/guides/measuring-risk/guide-to-the-psa-violentoffense-list (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
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deciding which of its local charges fall within the Foundation’s
definition of violence. As the Foundation’s implementation guidance
explains:
[A]n offense is categorized as violent if a person causes or
attempts to cause physical injury through use of force or
violence against another person. To ensure fidelity to the PSA
and consistency with its underlying research, a jurisdiction must
use this definition when creating its PSA Violent Offense List.
You may not use a different definition based on law or policy.333
Based on our conversations with practitioners and policymakers, we
believe that some are confused about this process, and incorrectly
believe that they can decide what violence will mean in their
jurisdictions’ score reports. (For example, they may wrongly believe that
by adding drug crimes to their local Violent Offense List, they can
consider the PSA’s violence flag to be a statistically valid tool for
predicting drug crimes as well as other crimes of violence.) In fact, the
PSA’s statistical model is not modified locally, and any jurisdiction that
deviates from Arnold’s definition of violence is to create a statistically
incoherent situation. They would be feeding the tool information it does
not expect, and preventing the tool from functioning as expected and
verified in validation studies. At a minimum these definitions must be
public. Clear definitions of exactly what an outcome measure means, and
for what relevant time period, are bare minimum requirements.
The precise period of time over which rearrest and FTA are being
predicted is a similarly confusing area that would likewise benefit from
clear public disclosure. It would be easy for a layperson to conclude,
incorrectly, that today’s tools predict the likelihood of a defendant’s
rearrest or FTA during that defendant’s particular pretrial period. But in
order to make predictions over such individual time horizons, an
instrument would need to incorporate some conjecture about how long
this particular case will take to resolve, and none do so today. Instead,
each of today’s tools predicts rearrest and FTA over a fixed time
period—such as, for example, two years. If a defendant’s period of
pretrial release is half as long as an instrument’s time horizon, then the
defendant will be less likely to be rearrested than the tool predicts. Thus,
it is essential that each tool disclose and publicize the number of days
over which it predicts rearrest or failure to appear.
Similarly, the underlying data upon which the model was originally
developed must be made public in some way. As mentioned in
333. Id.
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section IV.B.3, aggregate-level reporting of the development sample or
training data for any pretrial risk assessment tool is necessary. Such a
report should at least disclose the breakdown of rearrests by charge,
severity of charge, age, race, and gender. Disclosure of such data can
help ensure that the model was not overly dependent on charges that are
especially racially biased, like drug possession.
Overall, in order for bail reform to be best positioned to succeed, the
public needs a chance to find the kinds of risks we have described
elsewhere in this paper. Claims of trade secrecy or confidentiality
immunize pretrial risk assessment tools from meaningful public
inspection, including from judges.
3.

Community Oversight of the Tools and Frameworks Is Essential

As we argued in section III.C, the role of decision-making
frameworks in bail reform is sorely underexamined. Substantial attention
and scholarship is directed to the pretrial risk assessment tool. But the
goal of pretrial risk assessment tools is limited: to classify risk. Yes, that
classification is important in and of itself. But what judges do with that
information matters. Ideally, more scholarship and experimentation will
lead to a more robust debate regarding the role and importance of
decision-making frameworks.
Given the right conditions and sets of policies, decision-making
frameworks could operate as a strong force for decarceration. For
example, decision-making frameworks that presumptively favor release
on recognizance, or the fewest, least restrictive conditions of release, for
the vast majority of defendants would significantly mitigate the concerns
we advance here—that systematically overestimating risk will, in turn,
subject a substantial number of defendants to counterproductive
conditions of release.
Of course, most decision-making frameworks are advisory. Though a
decision-making framework advises a judge as to what conditions of
release—or non-release—are recommended for a given defendant’s
level of risk, a judge is largely free to assign what conditions of release
they wish. In fact, maintaining this level of judicial discretion is seen as
an important political bargain.
But maintaining judicial discretion does not necessarily vitiate the
need for community oversight. Ideally, a decision-making framework is
the product of vibrant community input and debate, from advocates,
former defendants, public defendants, district attorneys, the judiciary,
policymakers, and more. At its best, the document should formalize the
answer to the question: “How much risk will our community tolerate?”
Understood this way, a decision-making framework would provide any
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judge a strong signal as to what the community would like done with
defendants of various risk levels. Accordingly, it should be the norm, not
the exception, that judges concur with the recommendations of a
decision-making framework.
One way to increase concurrence rates is to make the decision-making
framework presumptive, not advisory, in releasing certain classes of
defendants, establishing heightened evidentiary and procedural burdens
for upward departures (that is, for steps that increase incarceration or the
intensity of supervision). For example, jurisdictions might require judges
to explain their decision when they diverge from the decision-making
frameworks’ recommendations. When judges do disagree with the
recommendations of a decision-making framework—which would not
be infrequent, even in a perfect world—a couple of steps could be
required. First, a system could immediately capture the fact that the
judge diverged from the recommended course of action.334 Second, the
judge could have to explain in writing why they diverged from the
decision-making framework’s recommendation. Ideally, this explanation
should be released in machine-readable format.
Under such a system, jurisdictions could plausibly be better
positioned to not only ensure that judges follow the recommendations of
a decision-making framework, but also be better positioned to lock-in
decarceral results. Such a system would offer valuable data to
policymakers and researchers, like: how often judges diverge from the
recommendations, for what types of defendants they diverge, and why
they diverge. The histories of bail reform, recited above, and of
sentencing reform offer current bail reformers a useful cautionary tale
for limiting judicial discretion through technocratic solutions.335
CONCLUSION
Pretrial risk assessment instruments, as they are currently used,
cannot safely be assumed to advance reformist goals of reducing
incarceration and enhancing the bail system’s fairness. Early evidence
334. Ideally, this would be linked to the defendant’s file at hand—that way policymakers and
researchers could analyze why judges deviate from the recommended course of action.
335. Note, supra note 291, at 1138 (“The history of sentencing reform warns that technocratic
criminal justice reform can be vulnerable on nearly all fronts. Powerful system actors can hijack
tools of reform toward their own economic, structural, and racial ends. In the face of political
pressure and media attention, the same legislature that passes reform can waver in its commitment
to evidence-based practices and undermine the project. And without buy-in, aligned incentives, and
limits on discretion, prosecutors and judges can manipulate technocratic reform. Technocratic tools
can be useful, but they cannot answer tough normative questions at the heart of criminal justice.”).
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remains sparse, and risk assessment instruments may yet prove
themselves effective tools in the arsenal of bail reform. But they have
not done so to date. Shifting to risk assessment-based bail will not
necessarily reduce incarceration. Without stronger policies, data
practices, and open governance, we believe it is likely that these tools
will perpetuate or worsen the very problems reform advocates hope to
solve.
Stakeholders who are eager to reduce pretrial incarceration and
improve the system’s fairness and racial equity may wish to renew their
energies on policies whose benefits are clearer, such as automatically
releasing broad categories of misdemeanor defendants. Where risk
assessments remain in use, their design and governance must be
improved.
If history is any guide, the most significant impacts of today’s bail
reforms may turn out not to be the ones that reformers intend. By
updating their models with recent, post-reform data, continuously
monitoring outcomes, measuring the indicators that truly matter, opening
tools to public scrutiny, and ensuring that risk assessments and
frameworks never recommend detention, today’s reformers can at least
minimize their own risk of frustration in the vitally important work that
they pursue.

